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Residential mortgage loans constitute a large proportion of the portfolio
of many banks and are one of the key assets in the determination of their
performance. Using a dynamic panel model for a sample of 555 banks in the
European Union (EU-15) we find that an increase in residential mortgage loans
seems to improve bank’s performance in terms of both profitability and credit
risk in good market, pre-financial crisis, conditions. The results also show
that credit risk and profitability are lower during the upturn in the residential
property cycle.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The recent turmoil in the world’s financial system, which originated in
the US mortgage market, illustrates the very close relationship between the
property market and the financial sector. Slumps in the property market
tend to follow and exacerbate or spur banking crises1, as demonstrated
by Allen and Gale (2000) and as is illustrated by several historical crises2.
Not only did the recent turbulence have its source in the US subprime crisis
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1Herring and Wachter (1999) state that “Real Estate Cycles may occur without bank-
ing crises and banking crises may occur without real estate cycles. But the two phenom-
ena are correlated in remarkable number of instances ranging over a wide variety of in-
stitutional arrangements, in both advanced industrial nations and emerging economies”.
2For example, in the US and Scandinavia (late 80’s), in Mexico and Japan (early 90’s)
and in Southeast Asia (1997/1998). Please refer to Hilbers et al. (2001).
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but the resulting banking crisis’ in several European markets were heavily
related to and intensified by real estate lending.
There is almost universal agreement that the fundamental cause of the
subprime crisis was a combination of extremely strong house price appre-
ciation and a credit boom. Pezzuto (2012) refers to the combined impact
of low interest rates, increased levels of leverage, “credit euphoria” from
both lenders and borrowers and a more aggressive short-term orientation,
as the factors which strongly contributed to the subprime crisis. Acharya
et al. (2011) note that when the “bubble” burst, a severe economic crisis
was bound to result. These events resulted in a collapse of the banking
industry3, severe negative responses in the stock market, a large decrease
in liquidity in the credit market, economic recession and have contributed
in a major fashion to the subsequent sovereign credit crisis. This crisis
affected financial markets as well as real economies resulting, in drops in
productivity growth, increases in unemployment, and a decrease in inter-
national trade. Horta et al. (2010) and Hwang et al. (2010) examined the
contagion effects of the US subprime crisis on international stock markets.
Hwang et al. (2010) found evidence of financial contagion during the crisis
in both emerging and developed (in this case European) markets. Verick
and Islam (2010) find that the Baltic States, Ireland and Spain were the
European countries that suffered the most severe labour market impact
and economic contraction as a result of the subprime crisis. In contrast,
Germany and Austria were the least affected.
Of all the different assets that comprise banks’ portfolios, real estate re-
lated ones are particularly important for two particular reasons. Firstly,
residential mortgage loans represent one of its largest asset categories.
Within the EU-15, for the period 2001 to 2008, the weight of residen-
tial property loans in total loans never fell below 21% (2008) and reached a
maximum of 33% in 2003 (ECB, 2005 and 2010). Secondly, banks’ exposure
to the real estate sector is even larger owing to the widespread use of these
assets as collateral for other types of loans. Furthermore, these figures if
anything understate the importance of the sector when one adds in loans
on commercial real estate and property development and construction.
Herring and Wachter (1999) argue that during an upswing of real estate
prices, banks have a tendency to underestimate the default risk of loans
directly or indirectly related to real estate. The existence of moral hazard
and disaster myopia, caused by high competition and an emphasis on size
growth, following the liberalisation of the banking sector and by the loss of
institutional memory regarding the possibility of property prices reversals,
leads to banks taking excessive risks whereas the charged risk premium may
3The list of banks that have been affected by the 2007-2012 global financial crisis can
be seen in
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List of bankrupt or acquired banks during the subprime mortgage crisis
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be insufficient to cover potential losses4. Jimenez et al. (2006) state that
during booms, riskier borrowers obtain credit more easily and collateral
requirements decreases. Dell’Ariccia et al. (2012) also found evidence of a
decrease in lending standards associated with substantial increases in the
number of loan applications. The authors show that lending standards
declined to a greater extent in areas that experienced faster credit growth.
They also note that the entry of new lenders contributed to the decline
in lending standards. With specific reference to the subprime experience
in the US, Demyanyk and van Hemert (2011) report that loan quality
consistently declined for the six years prior to the crisis in 2007. They
argue that the high level of house price appreciation observed in the US
during this period contributed to the decline in loan quality5.
Gentle et al. (1994) examine the extent of negative equity6 in the United
Kingdom in the early 90s, noting that the “property owning democracy”
turned into a “nation of debtors”, after the collapse of property prices. The
phenomenon of negative equity has also been observed by White (2010a,
2010b), who states that the collapse of property prices in the US resulted
in an increasing number of defaults, since the property market prices fell
below the original mortgage advance used to buy the property7. Koetter
and Poghosian (2010) using a unique dataset for Germany illustrate the
importance of not only considering pure price changes when examining the
risk of default. It is imperative that factors such as the degree of deviation
away from fundamental values are also factored in.
The interactions between financial institutions and real estate markets
have received quite significant attention in the literature over recent few
decades. Tripp and Smith (1993), Ambrose et al. (2003), and Igan and
Pinheiro (2010) discuss the relationship between real estate lenders, interest
rates, and the availability of real estate loans. Allen et al. (1995), He et
al. (1997), Elyasiani et al. (2010) and Martins et al. (2016) examine
the effects of real estate market conditions on bank stocks, and find that
4The Economist, 2003, reveals that the “six countries where houses appear to be
overvalued (America, Britain, Australia, Ireland, the Netherlands and Spain) also share
another bubble-like symptom: an explosion in mortgage borrowing in recent years. ...
In the Netherlands the average new mortgage there is 110% of the value of a home,
because lenders are happy to finance all the purchasing costs, including stamp duty and
fees. ... This means that if prices were to drop, more households would be left with
debts exceeding the value of their home than were a decade ago.”
5For specific work on default and foreclosures in the US subprime market in recent
years see papers such as Gerardi et al. (2007) and Daglish (2009).
6Negative equity refers to the situation whereby the market value of the property on
the mortgage completion date is lower than the value of the capital owing to the bank.
7The impact of default in the US was particularly evident in loans originated post
2005 in part due to borrowers being more vulnerable to a market reversal and the
corresponding decline into negative equity. In addition, as White (2010a, 2010b) there
was also the issue of strategic default.
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bank stock prices are very sensitive to changes in real estate prices. Davis
and Zhu (2009) examine the relationship between commercial property
price movements and the performance of individual banks in a range of
industrialized economies. Finally, Gibilaro and Mattarocci (2013) use a
representative sample of European banks to study the relationship between
the property market trends and bank performance/risk exposure for the
period between 2007 and 2011.
Despite this extensive literature on the relationship between bank loans
and real estate prices at a macroeconomic level, only a few studies have been
undertaken with a specific focus on the impact of real estate prices on bank
profitability and credit risk. Davis and Zhu (2009) argue that most studies
have failed to adequately highlight the role that real estate may play in
the performance of banks. Furthermore results may be biased given that
most studies separately examine the factors that determine either bank
profitability or risk.
Studies on bank profitability (see, for example, Maudos and Guevara,
2004 and Valverde and Ferna´ndez, 2007) or bank credit risk (see, for exam-
ple, Salas and Saurina, 2002) examine the role of macroeconomic factors
(such as GDP growth and level of indebtedness) or microeconomic factors
(such as market competition conditions, interest rate risk, credit risk, liq-
uidity risk, default risk and operating costs), but ignore, or inadequately
consider, the specific risks associated with banks’ real estate loan portfolios
(see Salas and Saurina, 2002)8. Davis and Zhu (2009) is one of the excep-
tions in the literature. They examine the effect of changes in commercial
real estate market conditions on the risk and profitability of a group of
banks from industrialised economies. The authors find that the perfor-
mance of banks and bank loans are strongly correlated with asset price
changes, particularly real estate assets, owing to banks’ large direct and
indirect exposure to the sector. A recent paper by Gibilaro and Mattarocci
(2013) also consider the issue, this time considering residential property.
Using a sample of European banks, for the period between 2007 and 2011,
they find that real estate exposure positively affects the risk of banks. This
supports the hypothesis that real estate banks are normally riskier than
other banks.
The present study differs from the study undertaken by Davis and Zhu
(2009) in three key respects. Firstly, it differs with regard to the category
of real estate assets analysed. We analyse the importance of the exposure
to residential mortgage loans instead of commercial real estate assets and
of the changes in real estate prices on banks’ risk and return. Secondly,
our sample includes EU-15 banks whilst Davis and Zhu (2009) analyse a
8Salas and Saurina (2002) state that “within the loan category there are different
levels of risk, with the riskiest loans being those to the real estate and construction
sectors, followed by commercial and industrial loans and, finally, household mortgage”.
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sample of 904 banks from several industrialised counties (including 8 EU-
15 countries). Thirdly, we propose a model of bank profitability vis a vis
bank exposure to residential mortgage loans taking into account the level
of bank credit risk.
We use dynamic panel data methods to estimate the influence of residen-
tial mortgage loans on bank profitability and risk, using a sample of 555
banks in the EU-15, over the period from 1995 to 20089. Our results suggest
that a higher exposure to residential mortgage loans on the balance sheet
seems to improve bank’s performance in both profitability and credit risk
in pre-crisis times. The results obtained further show a reduction in both
credit risk and profitability for banks during the upturn in the price cycle
pertaining to the residential property sector. The paper is structured as fol-
lows. In the next section, we briefly characterise the European residential
mortgage markets and provide a brief review of the factors determining
bank profitability and credit risk, with a special emphasis on those per-
taining to the real estate market. In section 3 we summarize the research
questions and present the specification of the empirical models proposed.
Section 4 sets out the results of the empirical analysis. Conclusions are
presented in Section 5.
2. DETERMINANTS OF BANK PROFITABILITY AND
CREDIT RISK
2.1. Residential Mortgage Loans in the European Market
We focus on the residential mortgage lending behavior of banks for three
main reasons. Firstly, excessive risk taking in real estate lending is con-
sidered to be one of the primary factors which contributed to the recent
financial crisis (Acharya et al. 2011). Therefore, an empirical examination
of how linkages between dynamics in the housing market and residential
mortgage loans potentially bank profitability and risk is of significant in-
terest. Secondly, residential mortgage loans are by far the largest category
in the loan portfolio of most banks. The ECB (2005 and 2010) show that
the weight of residential property loans in total loans of EU bank’s var-
ied from a maximum value of 33% in 2003 to a minimum of 21% in 2008.
Table 1 shows the importance of residential mortgage loans in terms of
GDP, value per capita and its weight in the balance sheet of European
banks. The table also reveals the existence of differing trends regarding
the importance of residential mortgage loans across the European market.
While residential mortgage loans in terms of GDP declined in Germany
from 55.6% in 1999 to 43.2% in 2008, there was a substantial increase in
9In contrast, Gibilaro and Mattarocci (2013) analyze the period 2007 and 2011. They
are therefore restricted in their ability to explain the patterns in lending observed during
boom markets.
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other countries. Specifically, Spain and Ireland saw an almost tripling in
the value of residential loans during this period. Of interest is the strong
housing markets seen in those markets during the same time period. Fi-
nally, a number of papers, including, Tsatsaronis and Zhu (2004), Acharya
et al. (2011)10 and Martins et al. (2015)11, argue that there are significant
differences between the EU countries with regard to the characteristics of
the mortgage market12. These institutional differences may aid in explain-
ing the differences observed in the volatility of prices, weight of residential
mortgage loans and influence any differences observed in bank’s risk-taking
across European countries (see table 1).
2.2. Bank Risk and Profitability and Real Estate Prices
The review of the literature presented below looks into the relation-
ship between property prices and bank risk and profitability. Whilst some
studies examine how property prices impact bank’s decisions in a macroe-
conomic perspective, others evaluate the role of real estate exposures in
bank’s profitability and risk.
2.2.1. The Impact of Residential Property Prices on the Banking Sector:
the Macroeconomic Perspective
Several studies have pointed out that there is a strong financial and eco-
nomic relationship between real estate and credit cycles, whereby decreased
economic activity leads to a feedback cycle of falling asset prices, deteriorat-
ing balance sheets, tightening financing conditions and constrained external
financing to fund profitable investment opportunities, and so forth. The
most influential argument refers to the “financial accelerator” mechanism
proposed by Bernanke et al. (1994) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). In-
10Acharya et al. (2011) identify the existence of three major funding models for
mortgage credit in developed economies: the classic deposit-based system; the MBS —
based system (used extensively in the US) and the mortgage or covered bond system
(popular in continental Europe). Covered bonds are issued by banks and share many
features with MBS, but they also differ in important ways. Most importantly, investors
in covered bonds have not only a general claim on the issuing bank but also on the un-
derlying mortgage collateral in the event that banks default. In Germany “Hypotheken
Pfandbriefe” represented 44% of all the mortgage bonds issued in the EU, followed by
Denmark (29%) and Sweden (15%).
11Martins et al. (2015) develop an analysis of clusters which reveals significant differ-
ences in terms of institutional characteristics across the EU-15 countries. Five clusters
emerge. The cluster formed by Spain, Ireland and the United Kingdom, with a less con-
servative mortgage credit system, a sparse rental market and a generous fiscal system.
On the other extreme, a second cluster characterized by conservative mortgage credit
system, a large rental market and a less generous fiscal system is formed by Germany
and Austria.
12These differences relate to a variety of aspects including: prevailing interest rates;
the possibility of Equity withdrawal; the level of LTV (Loan-to-Value) ratios; accepted
property valuation methods and the availability of asset securitization.
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TABLE 1.
EU-15 Mortgage and Housing Markets
Country 1999 2006 2008 1997-2006
ResidentialResidentialLoans fromResidentialResidentialLoans from% OwnerResidentialResidentialLoans fromOutstanding Real
Mortgage Mortgage Credit Mortgage Mortgage Credit Occupied Mortgage Mortgage Credit Covered House
Loans as Loans perInstitutions Loans as Loans perInstitutions Loans as Loans perInstitutions Bounds as Prices
% GDP capita for Housing % GDP capita for Housing % GDP capita for Housing % of (National)
(e000s) Purchase (e000s) Purchase (e000s) Purchase Residential Growth
(emillion) (emillion) (emillion) Lending (%)
Austria 13.7% 3.69 23,620 23.5% 7.34 60,737 57.0% 25.3% 8.56 71,346 11.8% −7, 20%
Belgium 27.6% 6.44 51,487 36.3% 10.86 107,378 78.0% 39.8% 12.86 86,346 n/a 98,07%
Denmark 76.2% 23.41 123,373 100.8% 40.90 217,629 54.0% 95.3% 40.57 253,168 100.0% 93,20%
Finland 30.3% 7.22 22,020 43.8% 13.93 55,307 59.0% 47.5% 16.67 67,633 n/a 74,04%
France 20.8% 4.74 280,963 32.2% 9.17 569,975 57.4% 35.9% 10.99 691,182 n/a 110,29%
Germany 55.6% 13.64 839,788 51.3% 14.36 976,123 43.2% 46.1% 13.96 959,840 18.9% −10, 63%
Greece 7.3% 0.79 8,518 29.3% 5.14 52,313 80.6% 32.0% 6.93 65,267 6.4% 73,40%
Ireland 28.9% 7.02 24,944 70.1% 29.29 111,403 74.5% 80.0% 33.75 115,233 15.5% 147,07%
Italy 9.0% 1.78 80,354 18.7% 4.70 244,409 80.0% 19.8% 5.23 264,414 n/a 60,57%
Luxembourg 22.4% 10.43 4,744 34.3% 24.69 12,208 75.0% 43.5% 32.93 15,940 0.9% 72,53%
Netherlands 60.8% 14.90 190,626 98.4% 32.20 369,642 57.0% 99.1% 35.94 375,656 3.6% 84,71%
Portugal 36.9% 4.16 42,208 59.2% 8.69 91,916 76.0% 63.3% 9.91 105,222 11.5% 7,18%
Spain 26.7% 3.88 145,627 58.6% 13.07 551,506 84.5% 62.0% 14.89 658,094 46.7% 116,90%
Sweden 46.4% 12.47 6,154 56.7% 19.18 125,746 52.0% 60.6% 21.68 128,484 63.5% 101,33%
UK 54.2% 12.82 793,797 83.1% 26.22 1,152,822 59.0% 80.5% 23.64 787,213 12.9% 138,19%
This table shows the values of residential mortgage loans, as percentage of GDP and per capita and total value of residential mortgage loans across
EU-15 countries, for three different time periods: 1999, 2006 and 2008. We also present the percentage of owner occupied residential houses and
outstanding covered bounds as percentage of residential lending in 2008 and the real house prices growth rate across EU-15 countries between
1997 and 2006. The values were obtained from European Mortgage Federation (Hypostat 2008 and 2006 — A Review of Europe’s Mortgage and
Housing Markets) and ECB (2005 and 2010).
creasing property prices boost bank capital by increasing the value of real
estate owned by the bank and the value of any collateral pledged by bor-
rowers. In particular, property price appreciation discourages riskier mort-
gage borrowers from defaulting (Daglish, 2009). Thus, increasing property
prices should reduce riskiness of banks’ assets and decrease the likelihood
of financial distress in the banking sector (Niinimaki, 2009). This collat-
eral value hypothesis predicts a negative relation between property prices
changes and banks’ risk.
However, alternatively, an increase in property prices could fuel the ac-
cumulation of risks by banks due to moral hazard and adverse selection
problems (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). Rising property prices and lower
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(perceived) risk of real estate financing may induce excessive lending to
risky real estate borrowers at unreasonably low rates (e.g. Jimenez et al.
2006 and Dell’Ariccia et al. 2012). Herring and Wachter (1999) argue
that banks may underestimate the default risk on mortgages loans during
strong property market conditions. Specifically, banks have a tendency to
disregard the danger of adverse selection when they expand lending within
a short space of time. This tendency towards “disaster myopia” can arise
as a result of poor risk management or a changing tolerance for risk13.
Consequently, the quality of the loans portfolios is likely to deteriorate
and the loans portfolio become much riskier during the maturity phase
of the cycle14. A further element in this regard is that participants in
residential property markets frequently display extrapolative or adaptive
expectations (Case and Shiller, 1989, Poterba, 1991). This can contribute
to the presence of myopic expectations in that participants may fail to
account for potential reversals in price trends (Malpezzi and Wachter, 2005,
Stevenson, 2008). Therefore, increasing property prices may encourage
riskier investors to speculative on further price increases and demand credit
from banks. Both factors lead to larger exposures and the accumulation of
risky assets, which are prone to mis-pricing. Koetter and Poghosyan (2010)
corroborate the importance of deviations from the fundamental value of
real estate, rather than just price levels or changes alone, when assessing
to bank stability.
Once a shock occurs, disaster myopia tends to become disaster magnifi-
cation. This phenomenon is further worsened by the fact that many banks
delay provisioning for loan losses to the recession phases of the property
price cycle. This results in the economic cycle having a greater impact on
bank capital and profitability (Laeven and Majnoni, 2003). The net result
of this is that the disaster myopia phenomenon might lead to banks taking
excessive risks, while the risk premium required may not be sufficient to
compensate for potential losses.
Another related issue is concerned with the diversification versus focus
debate (e.g. Diamond 1984, Winton 1999, Stomper 2006). Financial in-
13“Disaster myopia” can in part be attributable inter alia to inadequate data, mea-
surement bias (Borio et al., 2001), pervasive incentives linked to the safety net, intensified
competition following the liberalisation of the banking sector (e.g., Chan et al. 1986,
Hellman et al. 2000 and Marquez 2002) or institutional memory loss over time regarding
the possibility of property prices collapsing (Berger and Udell, 2004).
14Hellman et al. (2000) express the view that Japanese financial-market liberalization
in 1990 increased competition and reduced the profitability and franchise value of do-
mestic banks. This, together with others factors, lead to the East Asian financial crisis
and a weaker financial system in Japan.
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termediation theory suggests that banks should diversify to reduce risks or
focus their lending on industries about which they have superior expertise
to increase risk-adjusted returns. Traditional banking theory argues that
banks should diversify their credit portfolio, given that through the expan-
sion of their credit lines to new sectors, the bank’s probability of default
will be reduced (e.g. Diamond 1984). The idea is that due to asymmetric
information, diversification reduces financial intermediation costs. More-
over, less diversified banks would be more vulnerable to economic down-
turns, since they expose themselves to few sectors. On the other hand,
corporate finance theory supports the idea that firms should concentrate
their activities on a specific sector or group of sectors in order to exploit
the benefits of enhanced expertise in these sectors (e.g. Stomper 2006 and
Acharya et al. 2006). Another argument against portfolio diversification is
that it can result in increased competition with other banks, making this
strategy less attractive. In particular, Winton (1999) argues that diver-
sification only reduces the risk of bank failure in the case of moderated
risks of default. When the risks are low, banks may benefit more from
specialization than from diversification, since there is a low probability of
failure. Conversely, when the probabilities of insolvency are high, diversi-
fication may even worsen the situation, since the bank will expose itself to
many sectors, and the downturn of one may be enough to lead this bank to
bankruptcy. The overall conclusion is that the relationship between bank’s
focus and return is U-shaped in risk. Finally, Wagner (2010 and 2011)
shows that if diversification at financial institutions benefits the financial
stability of financial system, it also entails a cost — makes systemic crises
more likely. When systemic crises induce additional costs full diversification
is no longer desirable as a result and the optimal degree of diversification
may be arbitrarily low.
2.2.2. Other Determinants of Bank Risk and Profitability
Previous studies identify other risk and profitability determinants used
that we briefly review below.
Credit Risk
a. Macroeconomic Factors
Empirical evidence would suggest that there is a close relationship be-
tween bank credit risk and the economic cycle. When economic growth is
low or even negative, companies and households reduce their cash inflows
(sales, wages), which in turn leads to increased default on payments to
banks. In this paper we use the GDP growth rate to proxy economic activ-
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ity as GDP is considered to be a more informative measurement than other
macroeconomic variables, such as changes in unemployment, real wages and
real interest rates (Salas and Saurina, 2002).
Depending on the level of indebtedness of companies and households,
changes in aggregate economic activity may have different effects on credit
risk. Moreover, such effects may vary from country to country due to differ-
ences in the debt composition of households and companies (short versus
long-term debt), and differences in the relationship between banks and
companies. Davis (1992) finds that in countries such as the US, the UK,
Canada and France, a rise in a company’s indebtedness increases the like-
lihood of bankruptcy. In contrast, in Japan the opposite effect is observed.
Germany appears to be an intermediate case (non-significant relationship).
In the Japanese financial system there is a close relationship between banks
and corporates which leads to banks being highly informed about the finan-
cial situation of firms. Therefore, banks tend to be less reluctant to finance
companies during periods of economic recession, even if the companies’
debt ratio may be already high15.
b. Microeconomic Factors
Salas and Saurina (2002) argue that the three main microeconomic vari-
ables which could explain the banks’ risk decision-making are; the rate of
credit growth, the composition of the loan portfolio and the incentives to
pursue riskier credit policies.
Rapid credit growth is considered to be one of the primary causes of
increased bank risk. Clair (1992) and Solttila and Vihria¨la¨ (1994) show
that, after controlling for the composition of banks’ loans portfolio, past
loan growth aids in explaining current levels of bad debt. Kwan and Eisen-
beis (1997) empirically demonstrate that banks with rapid credit expansion
are riskier. Salas and Saurina (2002) illustrate that banks whom focus on
increasing market share tend to register lower levels of quality required
of their customers. Therefore, if another bank tries to encroach upon its
market share, a bank may try to keep its best customers and will let go
its lowest-quality customers. Consequently, if credit expansion is made in
a new geographical area or sector in which the bank has no earlier experi-
ence, it is more likely to be affected by and exposed to problems of adverse
selection.
Credit monitoring is also another key element in ensuring good credit
policy. To this end, an effective risk analysis and internal control structure
15Petersen and Rajan (1994) show that the existence of a close relationship between
a bank and a company increases the availability of funds for the latter.
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needs to be in place. The shortage and misuse of resources allocated to this
task may affect the bank’s solvency. Berger and DeYoung (1997) find that
decreases in costs efficiency are related to increases in bad debt. Kwan
and Eisenbeis (1997) further state that inefficient banks are more prone
to risk taking. Another factor which may affect credit risk is portfolio
composition, and specifically that different loan types have differing credit
risks. Therefore, the structure of the balance sheet, particularly the loan
portfolio, reflects the credit risk accepted by managers. Pensala and Solt-
tila (1993), Randall (1993), Murto (1994), Domowitz and Sartain (1999),
amongst others, state that different credit categories have different levels
of risk, with the real estate and construction sectors being the riskiest sec-
tors, followed by commercial and industrial loans, and finally, household
mortgages.
Keeton and Morris (1988) consider whether the high level of bad debt
of some banks is the result of a deliberately riskier credit policy, though
anticipated, by charging higher interest rates (a higher risk premium). The
authors conclude that banks which charge highest interest rates are those
which previously had higher levels of bad debt. The existence of incen-
tives by managers to follow policies of taking high risks may be another
factor determining bank credit risk. Banks with solvency problems can try
to solve them by relying on rapid credit expansion in sectors with high
profitability but also with higher risk. Contributing towards this situation
is the fact that shareholders and managers have little to lose, given their
limited liability and due to the fact that these banks have a low level of
capital. A subtler case appears when bank margins decrease continuously.
Managers can attempt to compensate for this slow but steady decrease by
adopting riskier credit policies that could eventually lead to an increase in
bad loans.
Profitability
a. Macroeconomic Factors
Valverde and Ferna´ndez (2007) use real GDP when analysing the factors
determining the interest margins of European banks16. The authors posit
that the relationship between banks’ gross margin and economic growth de-
pends upon the correlation between prices, costs and the economic cycle.
Economic growth tends to be negatively related to bank prices and costs,
16Maudos and Guevara (2004), Valverde and Ferna´ndez (2007) and Lepetit et al.
(2008b), amongst others, use the Net Interest Margin (NIM) variable as a proxy for
bank profitability. The variable measures the difference, in terms of yield, between the
active interest and passive interest from banking operations undertaken by banks, given
the asset total. It is similar to the gross margin of non-financial companies.
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however, the extent to which these variables are affected is varied. Carbo´
et al. (2003) state that the net effect of economic growth on bank margins
is not clearly determined. In their analysis of the factors determining the
gross margin in European terms, Valverde and Ferna´ndez (2007) include
a dummy which indicates whether a bank operates under a bank-based
system (in which bank balance-sheet activities are comparatively high in
relation to bank credit activities) or a market-based system (in which cap-
ital markets activities are comparatively high in relation to bank credit
activities).
b. Microeconomic Factors
A large part of the literature on the banking sector focuses on the deter-
minants of interest margins. In their pioneering study, Ho and Saunders
(1981) adopt the concept of banks as mere intermediaries between depos-
itors and customers, and state that the interest margins have two basic
components, namely the degree of competition of the markets and the in-
terest rate risk to which the bank is exposed. This model has been extended
by several studies: Allen (1988) widens it to permit the existence of differ-
ent types of credits and deposits; McShane and Sharpe (1985) change the
source of the interest rate risk, situating it in the uncertainty of the money
market instead of the interest rate on credits and deposits; Angbanzo (1997)
extends the model to take into account credit risk as well as interest rate
risk.
According to the theoretical model developed by Maudos and Guevara
(2004), the factors determining the “pure” interest margins are as follows:
the competitive structure of the markets, average operating costs17, risk
aversion, the volatility of money market interest rates and the credit risk.
Maudos and Guevara (2004) also state that, in practice, there may be
other variables explaining the interest margins, capturing the influence of
institutional, regulatory and quality of management aspects, which could
potentially distort the “pure” interest margin. Saunders and Schumacher
(2000) also argue that regulation, in the form of interest rate restrictions on
deposits or minimum reserves and solvency ratios, might have a significant
impact on banks’ interest margins.
17Maudos and Guevara (2004) state that “the extension of the model realized in this
paper yield the inclusion of an additional term, the average operating costs, in the
explanatory equation of the interest margin. Consequently, firms that incur high unit
costs will logically need to work with higher margins to enable them to cover their higher
operating costs. Observe that, even in the absence of market power and of any kind of
risk, a positive margin will be necessary in order to cover operating costs.”
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Acharya et al. (2006) find that a U-shape relationship between bank
returns and the degree of concentration, is a function of the level of bank
risk. Their results suggest that there can be diseconomies of diversification
in the case of banks which expand their business activities into highly
competitive sectors or sectors in which they have no prior experience. The
results reveal that these effects can emerge in the deterioration of the banks’
loan portfolio and simultaneously in reduced profitability. This is possibly
driven by deterioration in the effectiveness of banking monitoring, adverse
selection, increased general expenditure, or a combination of these factors.
3. SAMPLE AND METHODOLOGY
3.1. Research Question
The paper considers three core research questions.
I. What is the expected impact of the relative expansion of residential
mortgage loans on bank credit risk? Does the impact vary over the property
price cycle and is it influenced by the institutional characteristics of the
country where the bank operates?
The marginal effect of increase in residential mortgage loans on bank
credit risk can be written as:
d(RISKt)
d(RMSharet)
= α11 + α12 ×RPPRICEt−1 (1)
where RISK is the proxy for credit risk; RMShare is the weight of residen-
tial mortgage loans in the bank’s total assets and RPPRICE is the growth
rate in real residential property prices. The results will help to shed light on
whether residential mortgage loans have a positive or negative impact on
bank credit risk and whether the effect on credit risk increases or decreases
with the rise in residential property market prices (given by parameter
α12).
Tsatsaronis and Zhu (2004), Acharya et. al. (2011) and Martins et al.
(2015) note that there are significant differences across countries in terms
of the characteristics of the mortgage credit markets. They show that
markets with higher growth rates and less conservative lending practises
(with for example, high leverage ratios and the possibility of extracting
capital) also tend to have higher owner occupancy rates. By influencing
the level of risk-taking by banks, the institutional differences pertaining to
the mortgage market may help to explain some differences of the impact
of residential mortgage loans on bank credit risk. It is expected that banks
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in countries whose credit policy characteristics are less conservative have a
greater propensity to take risks.
II. What is the expected impact of the relative expansion of residen-
tial mortgage loans on bank profitability? Does the impact vary over the
residential property price cycle?
The marginal effect of increase in residential mortgage loans on bank
profitability can be written as:
d(PROFITt)
d(RMSharet)
= α12 + α13 ×RPPRICEt−1 (2)
where PROFIT is the proxy for bank profitability; RMShare is the weight
of residential mortgage loans in the bank’s total assets and RPPRICE is
the real residential property growth rate or the accumulated growth rate of
real housing prices. The results will allow an evaluation of whether residen-
tial mortgage loans have a positive or negative impact on bank profitability
and if the effect on bank profitability increases or decreases with the rise
in residential property prices (given by parameter α13).
Chan et al. (1986) show that increased competition erodes the surplus
that banks can earn by identifying high-quality borrowers. The reduction in
value leads banks to reduce their screening of potential borrowers and, thus
overall credit quality in the portfolio declines. In a context of asymmetric
information, Marquez (2002) notes that an increase in the number of banks
in a market leads to a dispersion of borrower-specific information and will
result in not only higher funding costs for low-quality borrowers but also in
easier access to credit for low-quality borrowers. The customers to whom
banks lend later in the cycle may not only be of lower credit quality but also
borrow more in terms of LTV. This leads to a combined impact. Firstly,
they are purchasing properties at higher prices due to buying later in the
cycle. This together with higher borrowing, in terms of LTV, leads to such
borrowers being more vulnerable to negative equity18. Thus it is likely that
the impact of residential mortgage loans on bank profitability will vary over
the residential property price cycle.
In order to test if the relationship between residential property loans
focus and bank profitability has a non-linear relation on risk, as Winton
(1999) and Acharya et al. (2006) defend, we employ interactions of RISK
and RISK2 with residential property loans focus. This is the last question
we address:
18This impact was particularly evident during the subprime crisis. Default and fore-
closure rates for the loans originated in 2006 and 2007 were substantially higher than
those originated prior to 2005.
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III. Is the relationship between bank profitability and residential mort-
gage loans a non-linear function? Is the relationship between bank prof-
itability and residential mortgage loans a function of the level of risk?
The marginal effect of the increase residential mortgage loans (RMShare)
on bank profitability can be described as:
d(PROFITt)
d(RMSharet)
= α12 + α13 ×RISKt + α14 ×RISK2t (3)
where PROFIT is the proxy for bank profitability; RMSHARE is the
weight of residential mortgage loans in the bank’s total assets and RISK
is the proxy for bank credit risk. If the marginal effect of the concentration
on residential mortgage loans on bank profitability is a U-shaped function
of the level of risk, then α13 < 0 and α14 > 0. Thus, the focus on residential
property loans would achieve better bank performance in both low and high
risk scenarios.
3.2. Variables and Model Specifications
3.2.1. Bank Credit Risk Model
In order to study the effects of residential mortgage loans on bank credit
risk, we estimate following model:
RISKit = α1RISKit−1 +
1∑
h=0
α2GDPt−h + α3DFAMt + α4DEMPt
+
3∑
h=1
α5LOANTOASSETSit−h + α6INEFit + α7SIZEit
+
3∑
h=2
α8NIMit−h +
3∑
h=2
α9EQUITYit−h + α10PREMit−3
+ α11RMShareit + α12RMShareit ×RPPricet−1 + Ti
+ ηi + εit (4)
where RISK is the proxy for bank i credit risk as measured by the ratio
between loan loss provisions to net loans (PROV ) or by the ratio of non-
performing loans and the total of loans (NPL) in period t19; RMSHARE
is the weight of residential mortgage loans on total assets of the bank;
19Angbazo (1997), Salas and Saurina (2002), amongst others, use NPL as proxy of
bank credit risk; Lepetit et al. (2008a, 2008b), use PROV as proxy of bank credit risk
and Acharya et al. (2006) and Davis and Zhu (2009) use both proxies as a measurement
of bank credit risk.
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RPPRICE is the rate of growth in real terms of the residential housing
prices (in the country or region, for those banks whose exposure to the
real estate market is at a regional level). Table 2 presents the residential
housing price series used in this study.
We use the following control variables. GDP is real GDP growth; DFAM
is the ratio between the liabilities of families and GDP; DEMP is the ratio
between the liabilities of companies and GDP; LOAN TO ASSETS is the
ratio between the bank’s total credit and total assets; INEF is the ratio
of operating costs to gross income; SIZEi is the ratio between the bank’s
assets and banking industry aggregate assets; NIM is the proxy for bank
profitability measured by net interest margin (gross margin); EQUITY is
the ratio between equity capital and total assets; PREM is the difference
between interest income over total assets and the interbank interest rate;
Ti and ∆i captures any unobserved bank-invariant time effects and unob-
servable effects of the intrinsic characteristics of bank i (such as managers’
risk-aversion and preferences), respectively. ∆it is the error term. The de-
tailed definition of the variables and the expected relationships are shown
in table 320.
3.2.2. Profitability Model
We estimate the following linear regression:
PROFITit = α1PROFITit−1 +
1∑
h=0
α2GDPt−h + α3BBMBit +
3∑
h=2
α4RISKit−h
+ α5
2∑
h=1
LIQit−h + α6
2∑
h=1
SDR3Mit−h + α7HHIt + α8INEFit
+ α9∆LOANit +
3∑
h=2
α10EQUITYit−h + α11IPPit
+ α12RMShareit + α13RMShareit ×RPPRICEt−1 + Ti
+ ηi + εit (5)
We use the Net Interest Margin (NIM) and return on assets (ROA) as prox-
ies for bank profitability (PROFIT )21. RMSHARE and RPPRICE are
20For a more depth explanation of risk management importance and determinants of
credit risk, please refer to Freixas and Rochet (2008).
21Angbazo (1997), Saunders and Schumacher (2000), Maudos and Guevara (2004),
and Lepetit et al. (2008b) amongst others, also use NIM as a proxy for bank profitability;
Acharya et al. (2006) use ROA as a proxy for bank profitability and Davis and Zhu
(2009) use both proxies as a measurement of bank profitability.
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TABLE 2.
Residential Housing Prices Series
Country Dwelling Dwelling Type Geographical Coverage Prices Description of Index Period Source
Austria New and
Second
Hand
Dwellings.
Houses and apartments. Vienna Transaction
Prices.
Weighted average price 1976 - Central Bank of Austria
(www.oenb.at)
Belgium New and
Second
Hand
Dwellings.
Small and medium sized
dwellings for sale by mu-
tual agreement.
Nationwide Transaction
Prices.
Average price index
weighted by the number of
transactions for each type
of housing.
1988 - STADIM (private consul-
tancy) (www.stadim.be)
Denmark New and
Second
Hand
Dwellings.
Houses, flats and holiday
homes.
Nationwide (data collected
at municipal level).
Transaction
Prices.
Average price per square
meter for municipalities
weighted with the dwelling
stock.
1971 - Danish Mort-
gage Association
(www.realkreditraadet.dk)
Finland New and
Second
Hand
Dwellings.
Houses and apartments. Large Cities (with more
than 100.000 inhabitants).
Transaction
Prices.
Average price index
weighted by the number of
transactions for each type
of housing.
1978 - Central Bank of Finland
(www.suomenpankki.fi)
France Second
Hand
Second-hand dwellings:
more than 5 years old or
sold a second
Paris. Transaction
Prices.
Paris: Average price per
square meter observed in
sales.
1980 - Notaires - INSEE
Dwellings. time within the 1st 5
years.
Nationwide. Country: Hedonic regres-
sion.
1994 - (www.insee.fr)
Germany Second
Hand
Dwellings.
Property offering a good
quality of life in average
to good locations. Ter-
raced houses and flats.
Western Germany: Before
1989: 50 towns/cities.
From 1990 onwards: 100
towns/cities. From 1995
onwards: 125 towns/cities
(100 towns/cities in
Western Germany and 25
towns/cities in Eastern
Germany)
Typical values
quantified by real
estate experts
who refer to price
data of various
types, including
non-transaction
prices.
Prices weighted through
population. Aggregation
based on the share of
terraced houses and flats in
the total living a´rea.
1975 - Central Bank of Germany.
Figures are based on data
from BulwienGesa AG.
(www.bundesbank.de)
Greece New and
Second
Hand
Dwellings.
N/A Athens and 17 major cities. Transaction
Prices.
Prices weighted with the
dwelling stock (in square
meters) in Athens and 17
major cities.
1994 - Central Bank of Greece
(www.bankofgreece.gr)
Ireland New and
Second
Hand
Dwellings.
All newly mortgaged resi-
dential property.
Nationwide. Price at mortgage
approval.
Simple average of house
price for new and second
hand dwellings in the pe-
riod in question.
1971 - Department of
the Environment
(www.environ.ie)
Italy New and
Second
Hand
Dwellings.
N/A 13 large urban areas. Transaction
Prices.
Weighted average price 1988 - NOMISMA
(www.nomisma.it)
Luxemburg New and
Second
Hand
Dwellings.
Flats and Houses. Nationwide. Transaction
Prices.
Laspeyere price indices. 1974 - Central Bank of Luxem-
bourg (www.bcl.lu)
Netherlands Second
Hand
Dwellings.
Detached house, corner
house, terraced house,
apartment, semi-detached
house.
Nationwide. Transaction
Prices.
Weighted repeat sales. 1976 - National Land Reg-
ister (Kadaster)
(www.kadaster.org)
Spain New and
Second
Hand
Dwellings.
All dwellings excluding
those that have a market
value over e1.050.000.
Nationwide (data collected
for provinces and munic-
ipalities with more than
25.000 inhabitants.
Price is calculated
by using official
valuations: “Open
market appraised
housing”
Average price per square
meter weighted with the
number of valuations.
1987 - Ministry of Housing
(www.fomento.gob.es)
Portugal New and
Second
Hand
Dwellings.
Flats and Houses. Nationwide (exclude
islands)
Price is calculated
by using official
valuations.
Weighted price indices by
hedonic regression and by
housing type.
1988 - Imome´trica
(www1.ipd.com)
Sweden New and
Second
Hand
Dwellings.
One and two dwelling
buildings.
Nacional N/A Weighted average of the
price indices of owner-
occupied adjusted for
ratable values and based
on the legal registration.
1986 - Statistics Sweden
(www.scb.se/)
UK New and
Second
Hand
Dwellings.
Detached house, semi-
detached house, bunga-
low, terraced house and
flats.
Nationwide. Transaction
Prices.
Mixed Adjusted 1969 - Department of
Communities and
Local Government
(www.communities.gov.uk)
The table presents the sources of residential house price series with its description, source, prices type, dwelling type, geographical coverage and first observation. All these series
were deflated using CPI. All series were obtained from Bank International Settlements (BIS): BIS House Prices.
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TABLE 3.
Determinants of Bank Credit Risk: Variable Definition and Expected Relationships
Variable Variable Definition Coefficient
Sign
Dependent Variables (Bank Credit Risk Proxies)
PROVit−1 Ratio of loan loss provision to net loans from the previous period. The current ratio is closely
related to that of the previous period, since loan loss provisions are not immediately written
down in the bank balance sheet.
Positive
NPLit−1 Ratio of non-performing loans and the total of loans from the previous period. Positive
Control Variables
GDPt−h Real GDP Growth Rate. Measures the impact of aggregated economic activity. The larger
the economic growth the lower the degree of default by economic agents.
Negative
DFAMt Ratio Between the Liabilities of Families and the GDP. This ratio measures the families’
indebtedness level.
Positive
DEMPt Ratio Between the Liabilities of Company and GDP. This ratio measures the company’s
indebtedness level.
Positive
LOAN TO ASSETSit−h Ratio between Total Credit and Total Assets lagged one, two and three periods. A target of rapid increase in
market share can force the bank to reduce the quality of its borrowers. However, since the loan is granted till it
becomes a provision loans, there is a lag unknown and variable. In order to measure the temporal effects, we allow
three lags, starting at t − 1. If it were lagged less are than one period, it could be spuriously correlated with the
dependent variable through the denominator.
Positive
INEFit Level of Bank Inefficiencies provided by the ratio “Operating Costs to Gross Income”. A higher value for the ratio
indicates that there are management inefficiencies. It is expected that banks with better management in place
have a lower level of loan provisions.
Positive
SIZEit Bank’s Relative Dimension provided by the ratio between bank assets i and total bank assets, during the period
t. As we noted in section 2.2.2.1, some authors use this variable to measure risk diversification policies. A big
balance sheet allows the managers to invest in different geographical or business segments to deal with asymmetric
shocks. If the relative size is a good proxy for risk diversification, we should find a negative coefficient. On the
other hand, this variable may capture the bank’s market power. In this situation, we should expected a positive
sign for the coefficient, because when the bank increases the market power, increase the probability of granting
credit to companies with a higher credit risk.
Positive or
Negative
MARGINit−h Bank Interest Margin obtained by the variable “Net Interest Margin”, lagged two and three periods. This variable
is a measure of the difference between the interest income generated by banks and the amount of interest paid to
their lenders (for example, deposits), relative to the amount of their (interest-earning) assets. It is similar to the
gross margin of non-financial companies. The present variable not only reflects the profitability of bank credit,
but also incorporates a risk premium. The increased risk will tend to provoke an increase in the gross margin, for
which reason the variables are lagged.
Positive
defined as above. The following control variables are used. BBMB is a
dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the bank operates in a bank-based
system and the value 0 if bank operates in a market-based system. RISK
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TABLE 3—Continued
Variable Variable Definition Coefficient
Sign
EQUITYit−h Solvency Ratio is provided by the ratio between Capital and Total Assets, lagged two and three periods. The
impact of solvency difficulties is not straightforward. The loans provisions will appear later because it takes time
to change credit policy. The higher the solvency ratio, the lower the incentives to take more risks. Therefore, a
negative coefficient is expected for the coefficient. Nevertheless, lower capital ratios may induce banks to “gamble
for resurrection”, thereby causing the opposite impacts on bank decisions.
Positive or
Negative
PREMit−3 Credit Risk Premium. The higher ex post credit risk may be anticipated by the bank charging an ex ante risk
premium in the interest of the loans. To control for this effect, we include PREMit−3 (the difference between
interest income over total assets and the interbank interest rate) as a proxy for the risk premium. The tree-year
lags is designed to catch the ex ante component of risk premium. If the riskier loans are properly priced, the
coefficient associated to the variable should be positive and statistically significant. However, it is possible that a
positive impact may not be found if strong competition induces cross-subsidization of products inside banks.
Positive
RMShareit The weight of residential mortgage loans in the bank’s assets. ?
RPPRICEt−1 The rate of growth in real terms of the residential housing prices in the country (or in the region, for those banks
whose exposure to the real estate market is at a regional level). Detailed information about residential housing
price series appears in table 2.
?
is defined as above and lagged two and three periods. LIQ is the ratio
of Liquid Assets to Short Term Funding. SDR3M is a proxy for interest
rate risk and is given by lagged annual standard deviation of daily inter-
bank 3 month interest rates. HHI is the Herfindahl and Hirschman Index.
∆LOANi is the rate of growth of credit loans. IPP are Implicit Inter-
est Payments given by the ratio of [Non-Interest Expenses — Non-Interest
Revenues] to Total Assets. The other variables are defined as above. The
detailed definition of these variables and the expected relationships are
shown in table 4.
In order to assess if the relationship between bank profitability and resi-
dential mortgage loans credit is a U-shaped function of the level of risk we
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TABLE 4.
Determinants of Bank Profitability: Variable Definition and Expected Relationships
Variable Variable Definition Coefficient
Sign
Dependent Variables (Bank Profitability Proxies)
NIMIt−1 Bank Interest Margin from the previous period. Positive
ROAIt−1 Return on Assets from the previous period. Positive
Control Variables
GDPt−h Real GDP growth rate. The relationship between the bank margins and growth will depend on the correlation
between prices, costs and the business cycle. Economic growth is negatively related to bank prices and costs,
although the extent to which these variables are affected may be significantly different, meaning that the net
effect on margin may not be clearly determined (Carbo´ et al., 2003).
Positive or
Negative
BBMBt Bank-Based or Market-Based System. A dummy variable is used in order to show the potential effects of the
differences in the bank margins according to the structure of the financial system. The dummy take the value 1
if the bank operates in a bank-based system and the value 0 if bank operates in a market-based system. Valverde
and Ferna´ndez (2007) found positive and negative signs, statistically significant, for this proxy.
Positive or
Negative
RISKit−h Credit Risk defined by the value of the ratio “Loan Loss Provisions to Net Loans” lagged into two and three periods.
The values of this ratio are lagged since risk parameters are not expected to affect margins contemporaneously. A
greater risk premium should be required by the bank when the credit risk increases.
Positive
LIQit−h Liquidity risk provided by the ratio “Liquid Assets to Short Term Funding”. The risk of insufficient liquidity may
force banks to request emergency funds at excessive cost. Angbazo (1997) states that the liquidity risk tends to
affect bank margin positively.
Positive
SDR3Mit−h Volatility of the Market Interest Rate is used as the proxy for the interest rate risk. The uncertainty in the money
market is reflected in the theoretical model by the variance of the market interest rate. The empirical proxy for
this variable is consequently based on a measurement of volatility of the market interest rate, such as the annual
standard deviation of the daily interbank interest rate at 3 months. The variable is lagged since the volatility of
the market interest rate is not expected to affect the gross margin contemporaneously. It is expected that the
interest rate risk increases banks’ gross margin (Saunders and Schumacher, 2000).
Positive
HHIt Herfindahl and Hirschman Index computed from banks total assets on the domestic market. In theory, the level of
concentration of banking activity and banks’ gross margins tend to be positively related. However, this relationship
may be influenced by third variables and the gross margins can be negatively affected by market concentration (see
for example, Cetorelli and Gambera, 2002). The HHI variable was obtained from two reports from the European
Central Bank (ECB, 2005 and 2010).
Positive or
Negative
estimate the following regression:
PROFITit = α1PROFITit−1 +
1∑
h=0
α2GDPt−h + α3BBMBit +
3∑
h=2
α4RISKit−h
+ α5
2∑
h=1
LIQit−h + α6
2∑
h=1
SDR3Mit−h + α7HHIt + α8INEFit
+ α9∆LOANit +
3∑
h=2
α10EQUITYit−h + α11IPPit + α12RMShareit
+ α13RMShareit ×RISKit−1 + α14RMShareit ×RISK2it−1 + Ti
+ ηi + εit (6)
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TABLE 4—Continued
Variable Variable Definition Coefficient
Sign
INEFit Level of Bank Inefficiencies provided by the “Cost to Income Ratio”. The existence of high operating costs implies
increased operating inefficiency. Therefore, we expect those banks experiencing higher costs to increase prices to
a greater extent (if they enjoy market power), so that inefficiency will result in higher margins (Altunbas et al.,
2001). Maudos and Guevara (2004) state that this proxy may, alternatively, indicate the quality or efficiency of
the management. There tends to be higher quality management when there is a lucrative composition of assets
and a low cost composition of liabilities. Thus a higher ratio would imply lesser management efficiency or quality,
which would reflect lower gross margins.
Positive or
Negative
∆LOANit Average Dimension of Operations or Credit Volume. In the estimation we use the loans growth rate as proxy.
In the model developed by Maudos and Guevara (2004), the gross margins are a growing function of the average
dimension of the operations realized. The reason for this is that for a certain risk value and market risk, a large
operation will tend to involve greater risk of potential loss, so the bank will tend to require a greater margin.
Thus, the potential loss will tend to be greater for banks with a high volume of credit volume. Davis and Zhu
(2009) refer that if the bank’s risk attitude remains the same across the credit cycle, its profitability should be
higher as a compensation for the higher credit risk. Nevertheless, if the risk-taking behaviour is associated with
distorted incentives, such as the “disaster myopia” tendency mentioned before, its linkage with bank profitability
is more ambiguous.
Positive or
Negative
EQUITYit−h Solvency Ratio provided by “Capital to Assets Ratio”. Valverde and Ferna´ndez (2007) state that debt substitution
for capital, lower the bank’s insolvency risk and possibly decrease the funding costs for the bank. But as the
capital is becoming a more costly source of funding, an increase in equity tends to increase the average cost of
the capital. Thus, a higher gross margin will tend to be required ex-ante. Davis and Zhu (2009) state that the
solvency ratio may have two opposite effects on bank profitability. If the cost-of-funding effect dominates, a higher
equity ratio leads to higher bank profitability. If the “gamble for resurrection” effect dominates instead, banks
with lower capitalisation will invest more on high-risk assets and the loan quality is impaired.
Positive or
Negative
IPPit Implicit Interest Payments. Following Ho and Saunders (1981), Angbazo (1997) and Saunders and Schumacher
(2000), the proxy “(Non-Interest Expenses − Non-Interest Revenues)/Total Assets” is used to measure the implicit
interest payments. This variable reflects extra payments to depositors through service charge remission or other
types of transfers due to competition in the market for deposits. These extra interest expenses should be mirrored
in higher interest margins.
Positive
RPPRICEit−1 Rate of growth in real terms of the residential housing prices in the country (or in the region, for those banks
whose exposure to the real estate market is at a regional level) or the accumulated rate of growth in real terms of
residential housing prices. Detailed information about residential housing price series appears in table 1.
?
RMShareit The weight of residential mortgage loans in the bank’s assets. ?
We also consider the impact of mortgage credit market characteristics
on bank credit risk and profitability. For this purpose, the variable LTV
(the average loan to value ratio in the country where the bank operates)
is added to equations (4) to (6). Finally, given that the sample include
272 ANTO´NIO MIGUEL MARTINS, ET. AL.
investment banks22 and a sample that covers part of the crisis period, we
re-estimate the models excluding investment banks and for a period until
2006 (pre-crisis time) as a robustness check.
TABLE 5.
Distribution of Banks by Country and Specialization
Country Number of Banks
Commercial Cooperative Real Estate & Others Total
Mortgage
Austria 16 9 5 10 40
Belgium 8 1 0 5 14
Denmark 40 0 2 12 54
Finland 5 0 0 1 6
France 37 50 3 5 95
Germany 28 6 3 10 47
Greece 13 0 0 1 14
Ireland 11 0 3 1 15
Italy 27 16 0 17 60
Luxembourg 11 1 0 2 14
Netherlands 18 1 1 6 26
Portugal 7 1 1 9 18
Spain1 22 5 0 43 70
Sweden 5 0 4 7 16
United Kingdom 24 0 34 8 66
Total 272 90 56 137 555
This table shows the banks distribution by country and specialization. The sample was
obtained from the database BANKSCOPE. We only consider banks with more than three
consecutive years of observations between 1995 and 2008. The banks’ specialization is
in agreement with the classification used by database BANKSCOPE. The specialization
category “Others” includes: “Bank Holdings & Holding Companies”, “Savings Banks”
and “Investment Banks”.
1 The column relating to “Others” has only Saving Banks given the importance of the
Cajas de Ahorros in Spain.
3.3. Dynamic Panel Data Models
Salas and Saurina (2002) and Valverde and Ferna´ndez (2007) suggest us-
ing first-differences of the equations above in the estimation of the dynamic
panel data models, in order to eliminate bank-specific effects (see Arellano
and Bond, 1988 and 1991). The unobservable individual effects (∆i) in
equations (4) to (6) tend to be correlated with other explanatory variables.
22The investment banks are characterized by not partaking in residential property
lending.
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For example, in the credit risk model, ∆i tends to be correlated with the
managers’ (unobservable) risk preferences and with the lagged loan provi-
sion ratio. If equations (4), (5) and (6) are expressed in first differences, the
individual effects will be eliminated. However, by using static panel data
estimation, estimates would be biased given that the transformed lagged de-
pendent variables will still be correlated with the transformed error terms.
Furthermore, the explanatory variable weight, RMShare, is endogenous,
and should therefore be defined with adequate instrumental variables. In
particular, three variables are treated as endogenous in the estimation.
These are the proxies for credit risk (RISK), profitability (PROFIT ) and
the weight of residential mortgage loans in total assets (RMShare).
To overcome the aforementioned biases, we use linear GMM estimation.
The instrumental variables for the endogenous variables are the same vari-
ables lagged throughout a number of periods, (h), sufficient to prevent the
second-order autocorrelation of residuals (Salas and Saurina, 2002)23. In
equation (4) the dependent variable is transformed, since the ratio of loans
provisions to loans is a truncated variable (between zero and one), and is
therefore not suitable for the GMM procedure.
Jimenez et al. (2012) show that changes in EU monetary policy affect
bank lending and bank risk-taking in all EU countries. They analyze the
effects of monetary conditions and economic activity on the granting of
loans with individual loan applications records depending on the strength
of bank balance sheets measured by bank capital and liquidity ratios. To
capture omitted variables, that vary across time (and affect all banks in
EU), they control for time-varying observed and unobserved firms hetero-
geneity with firm-month fixed effects (i.e. there is a dummy for every-year
or month combination). As in Jimenez et al. (2012) to analyze and quantify
the effects of residential property loans on bank performance, we include
observable bank characteristics and bank fixed and time fixed effects in the
specifications, thereby inevitably weakening performance identification.
3.4. Sample
23The consistency of the GMM estimator depends both on the validity of the as-
sumption of absence of serial correlation of the error term and on the validity of the
instruments. Arellano and Bond (1991) suggest two tests to validate these assumptions.
The first is the Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions. This statistic will be asymp-
totically chi-squared under the null hypothesis that the error term is uncorrelated with
the instruments. The second test, examines the assumption of no serial correlation in
the error terms. Under the null hypothesis of no second-order serial correlation, this test
has a standard-normal distribution.
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The sample is composed of an unbalanced panel of annual data, ob-
tained from the financial reports and accounts of 555 banks within the
EU-15 countries for the period from 1995 to 2008. The use of lagged vari-
ables reduces the time period of the estimations. The bank credit risk and
profitability models are estimated from 1999 and 2002 respectively. The
following table presents the distribution of the sample banks by country
and by specialisation.
The data was obtained from BANKSCOPE. Banks with less than three
consecutive years of observations, or missing information in terms of ex-
planatory variables, were excluded. With regard to banks where there is
no information available in BANKSCOPE concerning the amount of resi-
dential mortgage lending the information was collected from their annual
reports and accounts24. The decision to solely consider residential mort-
gage loans, rather than all mortgage loans, was three-fold. Firstly, the poor
quality and frequent lack of availability of price data for non-residential real
estate markets in the majority of countries considered. Secondly, the lack
of detailed segmentation of the non-residential mortgage loans. Finally,
given the quite different characteristics of the residential and commercial
property sectors, the focus on residential avoids a loss of clarity in the
analysis and interpretation. The data relating to the concentration index,
interbank market interest rates; residential housing prices; families’ and
companies’ indebtedness ratios and GDP were obtained from the Euro-
pean Central Bank, Thompson Reuters Datastream, BIS House Prices and
EUROSTAT, respectively.
Tables 6 and 7 present the descriptive statistics of the variables employed
in the estimation of the credit risk and profitability models.
Preliminary analysis per country shows that Spain, United Kingdom,
and Ireland are the countries with the highest weights of residential mort-
gage loans in terms of total bank assets. This is not particularly surprising
given the high house price appreciation observed prior to 2007 in these
countries. Additionally, banks in these countries operated under less con-
servative credit policies (Martins et al. 2015). Further, these markets have
some of the highest owner-occupancy rates in the EU-15. In contrast, mar-
kets such as Germany and Austria not only have more conservative lending
practices (Martins et al. 2015) but also experienced far lower rates of house
24IAS14 (substituted by IFRS 8 on 1st January 2008) “Operating Segments” require
companies to disclose the main operating segments. Given the importance of residential
mortgage loans in the activity of the banks analysed, it is possible — by looking at the
annual report and accounts — to calculate the amount of residential mortgage loans.
RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY LOANS AND BANK PERFORMANCE 275
TABLE 6.
Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Median Standard Minimum Maximum
Deviation
NPL (%) 2.843 2.075 3.043 0 44.400
PROV (%) 0.662 0.366 0.834 −2.297 35.353
GDP (%) 2.001 2.000 1.469 −3.000 6.500
DFAM (%) 72.871 63.720 27.989 24.240 148.280
DEMP (%) 201.861 192.850 49.795 90.230 379.400
LOAN TO ASSETS 59.055 65.622 22.824 0.523 99.130
INEF (%) 62.783 61.900 30.818 0.000 254.050
SIZE (%) 2.281 0.231 6.472 0.000 58.183
NIM (%) 2.613 1.925 10.533 −2.870 13.230
ROA (%) 0.707 0.560 1.764 −6.045 10.245
EQUITY (%) 8.317 6.719 6.745 −0.465 94.552
PREM (%) 1.890 1.532 13.444 −5.269 12.992
LIQ (%) 84.894 76.719 5.400 0.000 320.084
SDR3M 0.411 0.351 0.127 0.023 0.888
HH 685.148 551.000 489.445 158.000 3160.000
IPP (%) 1.187 0.752 15.862 −6.972 2.820
LOAN (%) 14.612 1.111 13.044 −37.672 54.000
LTV (%) 90.919 85.000 16.835 60.000 112.000
RMSHARE (%) 30.943 28.088 21.234 0.000 99.443
RPPRICE (%) 4.841 5.615 6.590 −14.742 23.222
This table shows the descriptive statistics of the 555 European Banks in the period
between 1999 and 2008. As proxies of the bank’s credit risk (RISK) we used the ratio of
non-performing loans and the total of loans (NPL) and the ratio of loan losses provisions
and the total net loans (PROV); GDP is the real GDP growth; DFAM is the ratio
between the liabilities of families and the GDP; DEMP is the ratio between the liabilities
of firms and GDP; LOAN TO ASSETS is the ratio of total loans to total assets; INEF
is the ratio of operating costs to gross income; SIZE is the ratio between bank assets i
and the total bank assets; NIM is the net interest margin (gross margin) — one of the
proxies for bank profitability; ROA is the return on assets (proxy for bank profitability);
EQUITY is the ratio between the capital and total assets; PREM is obtained from the
difference between interest income over total assets and the interbank interest rate; LIQ
is the ratio net loans to short term funding; SDR3M is the annual standard deviation
of the daily interbank 3 month interest rate; HH is the Herfindahl e Hirschman Index
obtained via total assets on the domestic market (the ratio was obtained from the
ECB and range between 0 and 10.000); IPP is the ratio non-interest expenses — non-
interest revenues)/total assets; ∆LOAN is the loans growth rate; LTV is the average
loan to value ratio in the country where the bank operates; RMSHARE is the weight
of residential mortgage loans in the total bank assets; RPPRICE is the rate of growth
in real terms of the residential housing market prices.
price appreciation and the weight of residential mortgage loans in terms of
total assets is substantially lower (see table 1).
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TABLE 7.
Descriptive Statistics by Country
NPL (%) PROV (%) GDP (%) DFAM (%) DEMP (%) LOAN TO ASSETS INEF (%) SIZE (%) NIM (%) ROA (%)
GER 2.748 0.441 1.172 69.159 169.207 0.479 72.971 0.893 6.573 0.207
(2.88) (3.30) (1.03) (3.89) (9.50) (0.235) (32.29) (2.42) (35.66) (3.53)
AUS 3.663 0.853 2.095 51.522 153.853 0.554 66.592 2.897 1.892 0.581
(3.49) (6.04) (1.06) (2.58) (24.34) (0.194) (31.87) (5.02) (1.31) (2.07)
BEL 1.102 0.210 1.927 43.030 240.480 0.420 64.568 11.991 1.749 0.734
(1.85) (0.62) (0.95) (4.01) (31.89) (0.201) (18.93) (17.98) (1.56) (0.91)
DEN 2.822 0.657 1.270 125.740 172.505 0.650 58.308 1.519 3.763 1.312
(2.49) (0.99) (1.30) (13.42) (23.11) (0.107) (16.53) (5.20) (1.66) (0.95)
SPA 2.122 0.494 3.107 74.136 200.300 0.679 60.184 1.413 2.305 0.796
(2.02) (0.28) (0.91) (12.19) (29.65) (0.150) (31.06) (4.01) (0.81) (0.98)
FIN 1.304 0.093 3.175 46.452 213.366 0.563 67.547 16.002 2.035 0.803
(1.24) (0.21) (1.24) (9.15) (19.22) (0.262) (18.66) (27.90) (1.18) (0.66)
FRA 2.006 0.467 1.647 55.712 205.644 0.586 63.525 1.203 1.950 0.920
(1.91) (2.00) (0.69) (5.80) (25.19) (0.259) (28.63) (3.59) (1.37) (2.16)
GRE 4.656 1.317 3.764 40.782 107.190 0.612 71.475 5.929 2.921 0.305
(2.64) (1.90) (1.35) (12.13) (13.67) (0.150) (36.21) (6.74) (1.03) (1.29)
NET 4.558 1.760 1.991 109.062 239.409 0.495 63.553 2.672 1.478 0.478
(3.34) (7.14) (1.17) (11.06) (15.10) (0.278) (34.44) (6.24) (0.99) (0.91)
IRL 1.848 0.244 4.509 82.717 278.896 0.527 63.505 2.584 1.256 0.771
(1.76) (0.57) (3.02) (21.04) (26.49) (0.249) (18.39) (3.24) (0.77) (1.18)
ITA 2.946 0.686 0.824 38.852 146.100 0.611 45.31 0.975 2.769 0.679
(2.51) (1.06) (1.02) (5.66) (8.47) (0.225) (44.18) (3.25) (1.33) (1.09)
LUX 2.528 0.123 3.927 55.554 317.992 0.308 54.415 4.723 0.959 0.680
(2.36) (0.038) (2.18) (5.84) (34.70) (0.163) (23.10) (4.38) (0.53) (0.66)
POR 3.221 0.750 0.879 93.025 241.243 0.583 61.305 4.184 2.477 0.753
(2.77) (0.90) (0.90) (9.41) (9.30) (0.229) (13.80) (5.75) (1.30) (0.81)
UK 1.649 0.384 2.329 97.738 253.201 0.662 62.985 0.682 1.997 0.769
(2.07) (1.40) (0.75) (10.08) (19.79) (0.203) (17.88) (1.71) (1.82) (1.34)
SWE 2.358 0.549 2.320 68.591 264.141 0.672 55.020 7.054 1.563 0.856
(2.55) (5.26) (1.44) (6.58) (26.80) (0.277) (29.26) (10.84) (1.05) (0.97)
This table shows the descriptive statistics: mean and standard deviation by countries, in the period between 1999 and 2008. As
proxies of the bank’s credit risk (RISK) we used the ratio of non-performing loans and the total of loans (NPL) and the ratio of
loan losses provisions and the total net loans (PROV); GDP is the real GDP growth; DFAM is the ratio between the liabilities of
families and the GDP; DEMP is the ratio between the liabilities of firms and GDP; LOAN TO ASSETS is the ratio of total loans
to total assets; INEF is the ratio of operating costs to gross income; SIZE is the ratio between bank assets i and the total bank
assets; NIM is the net interest margin (gross margin) — one of the proxies for bank profitability; ROA is the return on assets (proxy
for bank profitability); The table reports the mean and standard deviation for each variable and country. The standard deviation
comes in brackets.
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TABLE 7—Continued
EQUITY (%) PREM (%) LIQ (%) SDR3M HH IPP (%) ∆LOAN (%) RMSHARE (%) RPPRICE (%)
GER 6.581 2.350 70.603 0.295 174.75 2.423 7.221 20.032 0.318
(8.92) (5.29) (5.45) (0.17) (9.85) (36.1) (57.8) (17.0) (0.70)
AUS 7.525 1.798 100.21 0.304 545.37 0.912 11.767 20.902 1.903
(9.93) (2.17) (8.24) (0.18) (42.97) (2.3) (20.85) (11.1) (4.93)
BEL 5.279 2.132 59.634 0.299 1971.00 0.423 9.208 16.932 7.373
(2.59) (3.61) (2.93) (0.17) (167.74) (1.1) (31.7) (10.8) (3.09)
DEN 11.917 2.021 133.24 0.301 1132.37 1.422 16.101 27.923 5.271
(4.99) (1.52) (2.90) (0.17) (42.50) (1.2) (15.93) (14.2) (8.11)
SPA 7.907 1.175 92.96 1.100 496.00 1.323 31.239 35.623 7.472
(3.56) (1.11) (3.13) (1.18) (34.12) (5.2) (29.53) (15.2) (6.14)
FIN 7.158 0.245 80.64 0.299 2547.50 0.523 15.329 29.734 5.510
(2.89) (1.34) (3.84) (0.18) (316.47) (1.2) (51.7) (21.2) (8.20)
FRA 8.907 1.810 132.55 0.304 648.75 0.323 12.719 29.821 7.296
(4.76) (1.66) (4.92) (0.18) (60.00) (3.2) (65.0) (18.3) (6.60)
GRE 8.715 2.303 72.56 0.296 1117.75 1.623 38.086 23.523 4.536
(6.51) (1.47) (2.46) (0.17) (33.24) (2.2) (23.5) (11.2) (4.76)
NET 6.476 1.765 135.11 0.285 1841.75 0.523 36.167 24.232 2.568
(3.55) (3.39) (2.35) (0.16) (136.60) (1.2) (54.8) (23.2) (1.05)
IRL 5.184 1.006 84.65 0.295 597.87 0.223 23.905 32.321 4.210
(2.89) (1.61) (4.06) (0.17) (81.96) (1.6) (69.9) (26.2) (6.90)
ITA 9.978 1.823 120.23 0.295 265.25 1.723 25.373 26.823 5.188
(6.24) (3.36) (9.46) (0.17) (43.86) (13.1) (63.3) (15.2) (2.01)
LUX 5.253 3.930 41.58 0.289 293.75 0.156 12.651 11.012 6.316
(2.36) (3.82) (2.57) (0.18) (15.10) (1.4) (25.7) (8.3) (4.55)
POR 8.417 2.216 85.69 0.296 1073.75 0.934 22.206 26.121 −2.255
(8.21) (1.97) (3.47) (0.17) (64.16) (1.6) (46.4) (15.2) (2.16)
UK 7.859 2.413 93.97 0.384 370.75 0.534 6.254 34.523 4.791
(9.18) (37.99) (7.94) (0.24) (52.12) (30.4) (22.8) (28.2) (10.12)
SWE 8.460 0.951 179.31 0.346 845.25 0.223 23.940 31.623 5.618
(8.69) (1.35) (2.14) (0.16) (67.58) (3.2) (62.2) (26.9) (4.11)
This table shows the descriptive statistics: mean and standard deviation by countries, in the period between 1999 and
2008. EQUITY is the ratio between the capital and total assets; PREM is obtained from the difference between interest
income over total assets and the interbank interest rate; LIQ is the ratio net loans to short term funding; SDR3M is the
annual standard deviation of the daily interbank 3 month interest rate; HH is the Herfindahl e Hirschman Index obtained
via total assets on the domestic market (the ratio was obtained from the ECB and range between 0 and 10.000); IPP is
the ratio (non-interest expenses − non-interest revenues)/total assets; ∆LOAN is the loans growth rate; RMSHARE is
the weight of residential mortgage loans in the total bank assets; RPPRICE is the rate of growth in real terms of the
residential housing market prices. The table reports the mean and standard deviation for each variable and country. The
standard deviation comes in brackets.
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4. RESULTS
4.1. Credit Risk Model
Table 8 (panel A and D) shows the results for the estimates of the credit
risk model regression (4) — non-performing loans (NPL) and loan losses
provisions (PROV), respectively. Panel B and E shows the estimated co-
efficients for relevant subsamples of banks. Panel C and F report the es-
timation results with a constrained sample up until 2006 and excluding
investment banks. The results suggest that banks that increase their ex-
posure to residential mortgage loans decrease credit risk. These findings
are consistent with Pensala and Solttila (1993), Randall (1993), Murto
(1994), Domowitz and Sartain (1999). The results also show that during
the upturn in residential market prices cycle, a rise in residential mortgage
lending leads to a decrease in bank credit risk. Davis and Zhu (2009) have
also shown that commercial property prices are negatively associated with
bad loans ratios.
Martins et al. (2016) argue that due to the accentuated process of bank
internationalisation and integration at a regional and international level,
real estate assets tend to be related with regional or international residential
prices. The authors therefore suggest the use of regional or international
indices of residential housing prices as a proxy for the real estate risk factor.
Regression VI in table 8 (panel A and D) assesses the effects of altering
the proxy associated with residential property prices in the case of banks
whose exposure to real estate is at a regional or international scale25. The
results reveal that an increase in the weight of residential mortgage loans
in total assets leads to a greater decrease in credit risk.
Despite the possibility of “disaster myopia”, whereby the quality of bank
assets may deteriorate without the banks being aware that they are accept-
ing a higher risk level, Laeven and Majnoni (2003) state that there tends
to be a policy of delaying the recognition of loan loss provisions until after
property prices have reserved. This being the case, the relationship between
residential mortgage loans and credit risk tends to be only recognized in
bank balance sheets a posteriori, namely during a collapse in residential
property prices. Therefore, these results must be taken with caution and
in this context.
25Martins et al. (2016) consider that a bank is exposed to the real estate market at a
regional level when its assets portfolio associated with the real estate sector on the inter-
national market represents 40% or more. In order to measure the geographical exposure
to the real estate sector, they analyze the banks’ annual reports and accounts, namely
the primary and secondary segment reporting, which banks are obliged to disclose in
accordance with IAS 14 and IFRS 8.
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TABLE 8.
Determinants of Banks’ Risk: Dynamic Panel Analysis
Panel A: Total Sample and Bank’s Risk Proxy: Non-Performing Loans (NPL)
Variables I II III IV V VI
NPLit−1 0.0768c
(1.75)
0.0765c
(1.73)
0.0801c
(1.81)
0.1915a
(3.06)
0.2229a
(3.89)
0.1063c
(1.98)
GDPt −0.0464a
(−4.27)
−0.0463a
(−4.25)
−0.0624a
(−5.11)
−0.0311a
(−3.30)
−0.0582a
(−8.73)
−0.0526a
(−4.46)
GDPt−1 −0.0373a
(−3.60)
−0.0373a
(−3.59)
−0.0371a
(−3.38)
−0.0280a
(−3.01)
−0.0335a
(−6.29)
−0.0425a
(−4.02)
DFAMt 0.0066
b
(2.04)
0.0066b
(2.02)
0.0091a
(2.86)
0.0107a
(3.66)
0.0103a
(3.45)
0.0068b
(1.99)
DEMPt 0.0006
(1.08)
0.0006
(1.04)
0.0006
(1.03)
−0.0010a
(−2.88)
−0.0008a
(−4.17)
0.0006
(0.98)
LOAN TO ASSETSit−1 0.1099b
(2.63)
0.1058b
(2.52)
0.1285a
(2.88)
0.3573a
(2.91)
0.3992a
(2.87)
0.1049c
(1.87)
LOAN TO ASSETSit−2 0.0790
(0.68)
0.0782
(0.68)
0.0637
(0.47)
−0.3213b
(−2.26)
−0.3235b
(−2.17)
−0.0285
(−0.29)
LOAN TO ASSETSit−3 0.1001
(0.63)
0
(
.64)0.1001 0.0777
(0.45)
0.1009
(0.99)
0.0743
(0.72)
0.0468
(0.31)
INEFit 0.0006
(1.13)
0.0006
(1.13)
0.0008
(1.57)
0.0006
(1.24)
0.0003
(0.82)
0.0006
(1.02)
SIZEit −2.7257a
(−3.63)
−2.7249a
(−3.62)
−3.1320a
(−4.92)
−2.2740a
(−3.07)
−2.2731a
(−3.08)
−2.4447a
(−3.89)
NIMit−2 0.0019b
(2.46)
0.0019b
(2.46)
0.0017c
(1.80)
0.0020a
(3.78)
0.0017a
(3.18)
0.0017c
(1.87)
NIMit−3 −0.0055
(−1.36)
−0.0055
(−1.35)
−0.0053
(−1.21)
−0.0014
(−1.01)
−0.0011
(−0.90)
−0.0062
(−1.39)
EQUITYit−2 0.3347
(0.80)
0.3324
(0.79)
0.4216
(0.99)
−0.1399
(−0.46)
−0.1755
(−0.54)
0.2768
(0.64)
EQUITYit−3 0.4914
(1.24)
0.4939
(1.24)
0.6149
(1.43)
−0.0878
(−0.32)
−0.1335
(−0.46)
0.4805
(1.19)
PREMit−3 0.0347
(1.52)
0.0347
(1.51)
0.0326
(1.28)
0.0096
(0.52)
0.0036
(0.58)
0.0357
(1.54)
RMSHAREit −1.4450a
(−5.45)
−1.4388a
(−5.41)
−0.8446a
(−5.38)
−1.5299a
(−5.85)
RPPRICEt−1 −0.0524c
(−1.90)
−0.0041c
(−1.86)
RMSHAREit∗RPPRICEt−1 −0.0086a
(−2.86)
−0.0094c
(−1.94)
−0.0093a
(−3.58)
−0.0156a
(−3.31)
−0.0067a
(−2.75)
LTVt 0.1028
b
(1.99)
0.1022c
(1.74)
Time Period 1999-2008 1999-2008 1999-2008 1999-2008 1999-2008 1999-2008
# Observations 4540 4540 4540 4540 4540 4540
Sargan Test (p-value) 0.270 0.265 0.291 0.273 0.268 0.271
AR (1) and p-value −3.0a (0.00) −2.8a (0.00) −2.9a (0.00) −2.8a (0.00) −2.0b (0.04) −2.0b (0.04)
AR (2) and p-value −0.4 (0.77) 0.4 (0.79) −1.2 (0.25) −0.6 (0.61) −1.1 (0.29) −1.0 (0.26)
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table reports the estimation results of six regressions based on equation (4). The dependent variable NPL is the
ratio of non-performing loans and the total of loans and is used as a proxy of the bank’s credit risk (RISK). This
variable appears transformed (dependent variable ln(RISKit/(1−RISKit)). GDP is the real GDP growth; DFAM is
the ratio between the liabilities of families and the GDP; DEMP is the ratio between the liabilities of firms and GDP;
LOAN TO ASSETS is the ratio of total loans to total assets; INEF is the ratio of operating costs to gross income;
SIZE is the ratio between bank assets i and the total bank assets; NIM is the proxy for bank profitability measured
by net interest margin (gross margin); EQUITY is the ratio between the capital and total assets; PREM is obtained
from the difference between interest income over total assets and the interbank interest rate; RMSHARE is the weight
of residential mortgage loans in the total bank assets; RPPRICE is the rate of growth in real terms of the residential
housing market prices (or region, in the case of regression VI, for banks with regional or international exposure to the
housing market). LTV is the average loan to value ratio in the country where the bank operates. We use the Dynamic
Panel Analysis (Arellano and Bond, 1991) and GMM estimation procedure. t statistics are presented in brackets. a,
b and c denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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TABLE 8—Continued
Panel B: Subsamples and Bank’s Risk Proxy: Non-Performing Loans (NPL)
Variables VII VIII IX X
NPLit−1 0.0382b
(2.35)
0.2002a
(8.33)
0.1481b
(2.27)
0.3947a
(16.30)
GDPt −0.0363c
(−1.87)
−0.1561a
(−2.78)
−0.0469a
(−2.63)
−0.0212b
(−2.54)
GDPt−1 −0.0382b
(−2.47)
−0.0042
(−0.28)
−0.0576a
(−3.03)
−0.0067
(−0.84)
DFAMt 0.0180
a
(3.56)
0.0098b
(2.42)
0.0131c
(1.89)
0.0045b
(2.10)
DEMPt −0.0015
(−0.55)
−0.0003
(−0.27)
−0.0006
(−0.60)
−0.0011c
(−1.77)
LOAN TO ASSETSit−1 0.2559c
(1.70)
0.8617a
(4.44)
0.4921c
(1.97)
0.5146a
(3.54)
LOAN TO ASSETSit−2 −0.2329c
(−1.69)
0.0513
(0.32)
−0.1375
(−0.87)
0.1755
(0.93)
LOAN TO ASSETSit−3 −0.0506
(−0.32)
0.0314
(0.14)
0.0425
(0.16)
0.3257c
(1.72)
INEFit 0.0023
a
(3.63)
0.0002
(0.24)
0.0011
(1.56)
0.0031b
(2.30)
SIZEit −7.9962a
(−4.69)
−3.1020b
(−2.02)
−4.8550c
(−1.68)
−8.3614c
(−1.67)
NIMit−2 0.0007
(1.54)
0.0700b
(2.23)
0.0013c
(1.67)
0.0458
(1.31)
NIMit−3 −0.0011
(−1.48)
0.0647a
(3.05)
−0.0031
(−1.36)
−0.0068
(−0.18)
EQUITYit−2 0.8039c
(1.98)
0.4614
(0.59)
0.2544
(0.57)
−0.7931
(−1.55)
EQUITYit−3 −0.6370a
(−2.94)
−1.1641
(−1.57)
0.2221
(0.52)
−0.8719
(−1.52)
PREMit−3 0.0078c
(1.77)
−0.0045
(−0.34)
0.0249c
(1.86)
0.0129
(1.26)
RMSHAREit −9.7012a
(−3.35)
3.0927b
(2.11)
−15.4566a
(−2.59)
0.7686
(0.45)
RMSHAREit∗RPPRICEt−1 0.0309c
(1.84)
−0.0120a
(−3.78)
−0.0385b
(−2.03)
−0.0041b
(−2.04)
Time Period 1999-2008 1999-2008 1999-2008 1999-2008
# Observations 688 1273 1011 1081
Sargan Test (p-value) 0.185 0.144 0.370 0.188
AR (1) and p-value −5.0a (0.00) −2.6a (0.00) −2.8a (0.00) −3.3a (0.00)
AR (2) and p-value −0.3 (0.74) 0.2 (0.81) 0.3 (0.73) −0.2 (0.83)
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table reports the estimation results of four regressions based on equation (4), for subsamples.
We use the Dynamic Panel Analysis (Arellano and Bond, 1991) and GMM procedure. The dependent
variable NPL is the ratio of non-performing loans and the total of loans and is used as a proxy of
the bank’s credit risk (RISK). This variable appears transformed (dependent variable ln(RISKit/(1−
RISKit)). GDP is the real GDP growth; DFAM is the ratio between the liabilities of families and the
GDP; DEMP is the ratio between the liabilities of firms and GDP; LOAN TO ASSETS is the ratio
of total loans to total assets; INEF is the ratio of operating costs to gross income; SIZE is the ratio
between bank assets i and the total bank assets; NIM is the proxy for bank profitability measured by
net interest margin (gross margin); EQUITY is the ratio between the capital and total assets; PREM
is obtained from the difference between interest income over total assets and the interbank interest
rate; RMSHARE is the weight of residential mortgage loans in the total bank assets; RPPRICE is the
rate of growth in real terms of the domestic residential housing market prices.
Regression VII includes the banks of Germany and Austria. Regression VIII includes de banks of Spain,
Ireland and UK. Regressions IX and X are estimated for the first quartile and fourth quartile, according
to the weight of residential mortgage loans in total loans, respectively. t statistics are presented in
brackets. a, b and c denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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TABLE 8—Continued
Panel C: Total Sample without Investment Banks for Pre-Crisis Period and Bank’s Risk
Proxy: Non-Performing Loans (NPL)
Variables XI XII XIII XIV XV XVI
NPLit−1 0.1099c
(1.70)
0.1099c
(1.70)
0.1068c
(1.67)
0.1999a
(3.84)
0.1993a
(3.73)
0.1936a
(3.67)
GDPt −0.0353a
(−3.35)
−0.0354a
(−3.35)
−0.0364a
(−3.34)
−0.0222a
(−3.84)
−0.0231a
(−3.99)
−0.0227a
(−4.01)
GDPt−1 −0.0350a
(−3.09)
−0.0351a
(−3.09)
−0.0338a
(−2.94)
−0.0212a
(−3.86)
−0.0204a
(−3.69)
−0.0185a
(−3.39)
DFAMt 0.0093
b
(1.99)
0.0090b
(2.02)
0.0076a
(2.92)
0.0011a
(4.66)
0.0011a
(4.76)
0.0006b
(2.34)
DEMPt −0.0006c
(−1.67)
−0.0006c
(−1.73)
−0.0006c
(−1.80)
−0.0007a
(−3.25)
−0.0006a
(−2.78)
−0.0007a
(3.07)
LOAN TO ASSETSit−1 0.4225b
(2.30)
0.4227b
(2.31)
0.4138b
(2.22)
0.5169a
(3.86)
0.4558a
(3.35)
0.4442a
(3.22)
LOAN TO ASSETSit−2 0.1276
(0.25)
0.1266
(0.24)
0.1091
(0.21)
−0.4741b
(−2.37)
−0.4741b
(−2.40)
−0.4410b
(−2.29)
LOAN TO ASSETSit−3 0.1049
(0.84)
0.1044
(0.84)
0.0727
(0.59)
0.1346
(0.93)
0.1047
(0.73)
0.1728
(1.22)
INEFit −0.0001
(−0,11)
−0.0002
(−0.12)
0.0000
(0.01)
0.0004
(0.72)
0.0004
(0.72)
0.0006
(0.97)
SIZEit −2.6363a
(−3.79)
−2.6336a
(−3.80)
−2.6109a
(−4.47)
−2.0914a
(−2.67)
−2.0814a
(−2,97)
−2.1931a
(−2.92)
NIMit−2 0.0028a
(3.49)
0.0028a
(3.49)
0.0028a
(3.39)
0.0015a
(3.21)
0.0015a
(3.08)
0.0018a
(3.87)
NIMit−3 −0.0050
(−1.25)
−0.0050
(−1.15)
−0.0050
(−1.15)
−0.0006
(−0.39)
−0.0009
(−0.65)
−0.0007
(−0.44)
EQUITYit−2 0.7584
(1.21)
0.7560
(1.24)
0.8269
(1.33)
0.0080
(0.020)
0.1518
(0.38)
0.2049
(0.53)
EQUITYit−3 0.4927
(1.17)
0.4926
(1.37)
0.4728
(1.31)
−0.2553
(−0.67)
−0.2966
(−0.76)
−0.4007
(−1.13)
PREMit−3 0.0341
(1.35)
0.0341
(1.34)
0.0343
(1.34)
−0.0041
(−0.57)
−0.0016
(−0.23)
−0.0009
(−0.11)
RMSHAREit −1.0517a
(−3.66)
−1.0561a
(−3.64)
−1.2469a
(−3.67)
−1.3366a
(−4.51)
RPPRICEt−1 −0.0626c
(−1.78)
−0.0040c
(−1.79)
RMSHAREit∗RPPRICEt−1 −0.0061a
(−3.29)
−0.0021c
(−1.81)
−0.0133a
(−4.66)
−0.0114b
(−2.00)
−0.0041b
(−2.14)
LTVt 0.2696
a
(4.42)
0.2618a
(4.19)
Time Period 1999-2006 1999-2006 1999-2006 1999-2006 1999-2006 1999-2006
# Observations 3297 3297 3297 3297 3297 3297
Sargan Test (p-value) 0.235 0.245 0.267 0.289 0.278 0.253
AR (1) and p-value −3.3a (0.00) −2.9a (0.00) −2.7a (0.00) −2.8a (0.00) −2.1b (0.03) −2.0b (0.04)
AR (2) and p-value −0.4 (0.75) 0.4 (0.80) −1.3 (0.20) −0.5 (0.67) −1.1 (0.29) −0.9 (0.21)
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table reports the estimation results of six regressions based on equation (4) for the total sample without investment
banks and a period until 2006 (pre-crisis time). The dependent variable NPL is the ratio non-performing loans and the
total of loans and is used as a proxy of the bank’s credit risk (RISK). This variable appears transformed (dependent
variable ln(RISKit/(1−RISKit)). GDP is the real GDP growth; DFAM is the ratio between the liabilities of families
and the GDP; DEMP is the ratio between the liabilities of firms and GDP; LOAN TO ASSETS is the ratio of total
loans to total assets; INEF is the ratio of operating costs to gross income; SIZE is the ratio between bank assets i
and the total bank assets; NIM is the proxy for bank profitability measured by net interest margin (gross margin);
EQUITY is the ratio between the capital and total assets; PREM is obtained from the difference between interest
income over total assets and the interbank interest rate; RMSHARE is the weight of residential mortgage loans in the
total bank assets; RPPRICE is the rate of growth in real terms of the residential housing market prices (or region,
in the case of regression XVI, for banks with regional or international exposure to the housing market). LTV is the
average loan to value ratio in the country where the bank operates. We use the Dynamic Panel Analysis (Arellano
and Bond, 1991) and GMM estimation procedure. t statistics are presented in brackets. a, b and c denote statistical
significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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TABLE 8—Continued
Panel D: Total Sample and Bank’s Risk Proxy: Loan Losses Provisions (PROV)
Variables I II III IV V VI
PROVit−1 −0.3599a
(−4.32)
−0.3610a
(−4.40)
−0.3598a
(−4.11)
−0.3736a
(−4.20)
−0.3746a
(−4.33)
−0.3590a
(−4.42)
GDPt −0.0982a
(−5.94)
−0.0933a
(−5.62)
−0.0899a
(−5.40)
−0.1228a
(−9.17)
−0.1233a
(−9.32)
−0.0980a
(−3.89)
GDPt−1 −0.0778a
(−4.48)
−0.0739a
(−4.25)
−0.0699a
(−3.99)
−0.0282b
(−2.01)
−0.0276b
(−2.02)
−0.0777a
(−3.77)
DFAMt 0.0032
b
(1.97)
0.0036b
(1.99)
0.0043c
(1.76)
0.0172a
(2.85)
0.0181a
(2.99)
0.0033c
(1.79)
DEMPt −0.0013
(−1.47)
−0.0011
(−1.26)
−0.0009
(1.03)
−0.0014
(−1.59)
−0.0010
(−1.22)
−0.0012
(−0.99)
LOAN TO ASSETSit−1 0.3047c
(1.75)
0.3084c
(1.82)
0.3373c
(1.88)
0.2090c
(1.68)
0.2539c
(1.77)
0.3035c
(1.84)
LOAN TO ASSETSit−2 0.0389
(0.18)
0.0693
(0.31)
0.0643
(0.29)
0.2795
(1.16)
0.2472
(1.03)
0.0376
(0.15)
LOAN TO ASSETSit−3 −0.0297
(−0.13)
−0.0567
(−0.24)
−0.0901
(−0.38)
0.0884
(0.34)
0.0349
(0.89)
−0.0291
(−0.11)
INEFit 0.0014
(1.34)
0.0006
(1.12)
0.0004
(1.14)
0.0005
(0.32)
0.0003
(0.20)
0.0004
(0.33)
SIZEit −0.4494
(−0.54)
−0.4795
(−0.65)
−0.5606
(−0.76)
−0.5555
(−1.05)
−0.6260
(−1.17)
−0.4482
(−0.84)
NIMit−2 0.0017b
(2.57)
0.0017b
(2.52)
0.0017b
(2.48)
0.0033a
(2.85)
0.0038a
(2.73)
0.0017c
(1.90)
NIMit−3 −0.0019
(−0.57)
−0.0023
(−0.68)
−0.0026
(−0.77)
−0.0003
(−0.27)
−0.0007
(−0.52)
−0.0019
(−0.64)
EQUITYit−2 −1.2752b
(−1.99)
−1.2256c
(−1.91)
−1.1785c
(−1.84)
−1.1552c
(−1.75)
−0.9985c
(−1.77)
−1.2767c
(−1.69)
EQUITYit−3 0.3475
(0.55)
0.3259
(0.53)
0.2797
(0.45)
−0.0137
(−0.13)
−0.0350
(−0.34)
0.3496
(0.39)
PREMit−3 0.0116
(1.32)
0.0133
(1.51)
0.0145c
(1.65)
0.0063b
(1.99)
0.0064b
(2.22)
0.0116c
(1.72)
RMSHAREit −0.6104a
(−3.69)
−0.5113a
(−3.41)
−0.3958a
(−2.89)
−0.6062a
(−2.85)
RPPRICEt−1 −0.0134c
(−2.68)
−0.0179a
(−3.23)
RMSHAREit∗RPPRICEt−1 −0.0180a
(−2.60)
−0.0062c
(−1.79)
−0.0338a
(−4.69)
−0.0070b
(−2.23)
−0.0055b
(−2.16)
LTVt 0.0211
b
(2.11)
0.0288c
(1.99)
Time Period 1999-2008 1999-2008 1999-2008 1999-2008 1999-2008 1999-2008
# Observations 4540 4540 4540 4540 4540 4540
Sargan Test (p-value) 0.144 0.169 0.211 0.244 0.268 0.271
AR (1) and p-value −2.6a (0.00) −2.7a (0.00) -2.8a (0.00) −2.9a (0.00) −2.7a (0.00) −2.5a (0.00)
AR (2) and p-value −0.2 (0.81) 0.4 (0.79) −1.3 (0.20) −0.5 (0.67) −1.0 (0.36) −1.0 (0.26)
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table reports the estimation results of six regressions based on equation (4). The dependent variable PROV is the ratio of loan
losses provisions and the total of net loans and is used as a proxy of the bank’s credit risk (RISK). This variable appears transformed
(dependent variable ln(RISKit/(1−RISKit)). GDP is the real GDP growth; DFAM is the ratio between the liabilities of families and
the GDP; DEMP is the ratio between the liabilities of firms and GDP; LOAN TO ASSETS is the ratio of total loans to total assets;
INEF is the ratio of operating costs to gross income; SIZE is the ratio between bank assets i and the total bank assets; NIM is the
proxy for bank profitability measured by net interest margin (gross margin); EQUITY is the ratio between the capital and total assets;
PREM is obtained from the difference between interest income over total assets and the interbank interest rate; RMSHARE is the
weight of residential mortgage loans in the total bank assets; RPPRICE is the rate of growth in real terms of the residential housing
market prices (or region, in the case of regression VI, for banks with regional or international exposure to the housing market). LTV
is the average loan to value ratio in the country where the bank operates. We use the Dynamic Panel Analysis (Arellano and Bond,
1991) and GMM estimation procedure. t statistics are presented in brackets. a, b and c denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and
10%, respectively.
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TABLE 8—Continued
Panel E: Subsamples and Bank’s Risk Proxy: Loan Losses Provisions (PROV)
Variables VII VIII IX X
PROVit−1 −0.3767a
(−9.48)
−0.6177a
(−7.33)
−0.4425a
(−8.99)
−0.3571a
(−10.46)
GDPt −0.0583b
(−2.09)
−0.2285a
(−10.43)
−0.1316a
(−4.66)
−0.1613a
(−7.74)
GDPt−1 −0.0610b
(−2.19)
−0.0366
(−1.20)
−0.0293
(−0.75)
−0.0297
(−1.10)
DFAMt 0.0109
a
(2.86)
0.0093b
(2.09)
0.0235b
(2.18)
0.0108c
(1.82)
DEMPt −0.0025
(−0.81)
0.0006
(0.44)
−0.0053a
(−2.90)
0.0016
(1.28)
LOAN TO ASSETSit−1 0.9857b
(2.34)
1.1974b
(2.53)
0.8375c
(1.77)
1.6597b
(2.32)
LOAN TO ASSETSit−2 0.3235
(0.84)
−0.0028
(−0.01)
0.2999
(0.75)
0.4773
(0.64)
LOAN TO ASSETSit−3 0.0868
(0.18)
−0.3137
(−0.71)
−0.2414
(−0.49)
1.2307b
(1.99)
INEFit 0.0055
c
(1.91)
−0.0011
(−0.46)
−0.0034c
(−1.86)
0.0106a
(3.05)
SIZEit −0.9575
(−0.42)
−2.2527b
(−2.11)
−6.9324c
(−1.87)
1.1485
(0.86)
NIMit−2 0.0009
(0.64)
0.0700b
(2.23)
0.0031c
(1.72)
0.0692
(0.91)
NIMit−3 0.0012
(0.60)
0.0647a
(3.05)
−0.0004
(−0.11)
−0.0293
(−0.44)
EQUITYit−2 2.8718b
(2.31)
−1.1718
(−0.93)
−0.8191
(−0.76)
−0.1088
(−0.90)
EQUITYit−3 −0.4308
(−0.29)
−3.8491b
(−2.52)
2.2014c
(1.89)
0.9004
(0.65)
PREMit−3 0.0064a
(2.77)
0.0045b
(2.09)
0.0019
(0.80)
0.0608b
(2.23)
RMSHAREit −3.9286a
(−3.02)
2.2963b
(2.05)
−7.1398a
(−3.17)
0.7762
(0.48)
RMSHAREit∗RPPRICEt−1 1
(
.71)0.0239c −0.0259a
(−3.47)
−0.1232b
(−2.06)
−0.0285a
(−3.79)
Time Period 1999-2008 1999-2008 1999-2008 1999-2008
# Observations 688 1273 1011 1081
Sargan Test (p-value) 0.176 0.137 0.370 0.168
AR (1) and p-value −4.6a (0.00) −2.5a (0.00) −2.7a (0.00) −3.0a (0.00)
AR (2) and p-value −0.3 (0.72) 0.2 (0.79) 0.3 (0.71) −0.2 (0.80)
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table reports the estimation results of four regressions based on equation (4), for subsamples.
We use the Dynamic Panel Analysis (Arellano and Bond, 1991) and GMM procedure. The dependent
variable PROV is the ratio of loan losses provisions and the total net loans (PROV) and is used
as a proxy of the bank’s credit risk (RISK). This variable appears transformed (dependent variable
ln(RISKit/(1−RISKit)). GDP is the real GDP growth; DFAM is the ratio between the liabilities of
families and the GDP; DEMP is the ratio between the liabilities of firms and GDP; LOAN TO ASSETS
is the ratio of total loans to total assets; INEF is the ratio of operating costs to gross income; SIZE is the
ratio between bank assets i and the total bank assets; NIM is the proxy for bank profitability measured
by net interest margin (gross margin); EQUITY is the ratio between the capital and total assets; PREM
is obtained from the difference between interest income over total assets and the interbank interest
rate; RMSHARE is the weight of residential mortgage loans in the total bank assets; RPPRICE is the
rate of growth in real terms of the domestic residential housing market prices.
Regression VII includes the banks of Germany and Austria. Regression VIII includes de banks of Spain,
Ireland and UK. Regressions IX and X are estimated for the first quartile and fourth quartile, according
to the weight of residential mortgage loans in total loans, respectively. t statistics are presented in
brackets. a, b and c denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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TABLE 8—Continued
Panel F: Total Sample without Investment Banks for Pre-Crisis Period and Bank’s Risk
Proxy: Loan Losses Provisions (PROV)
Variables XI XII XIII XIV XV XVI
RISKit−1 −0.3494a
(−12.03)
−0.3517a
(−12.06)
−0.3515a
(−12.01)
−0.3647a
(−12.61)
−0.3648a
(−12.60)
−0.3498a
(−12.08)
GDPt −0.0432c
(−1.82)
−0.0400c
(−1.68)
−0.0374c
(−1.77)
−0.0180c
(−1.76)
−0.0131c
(−1.69)
−0.0421c
(−1.77)
GDPt−1 −0.0264
(−1.26)
−0.0248
(−1.16)
−0.0223
(−1.05)
−0.0053
(−0.24)
−0.0014
(−0.07)
−0.0265
(−1.25)
DFAMt 0.0113
c
(1.83)
0.0117c
(1.88)
0.0118c
(1.90)
0.0288a
(4.16)
0.0293a
(4.16)
0.0112c
(1.80)
DEMPt −0.0003
(−0.21)
0.0001
(0.12)
0.0004
(0.28)
−0.0010
(−0.86)
−0.0008
(−0.63)
−0.0003
(−0.24)
LOAN TO ASSETSit−1 0.7179b
(2.22)
0.7332b
(2.28)
0.7719b
(2.38)
0.7076b
(2.16)
0.7533b
(2.27)
0.7233b
(2.24)
LOAN TO ASSETSit−2 0.1767
(0.53)
0.2106
(0.64)
0.1933
(0.57)
0.2700
(0.85)
0.2567
(0.79)
0.1703
(0.51)
LOAN TO ASSETSit−3 0.3995
(1.10)
0.3599
(0.99)
0.3042
(0.82)
0.2704
(0.75)
0.1951
(0.53)
0.4000
(0.27)
INEFit −0.0033c
(−1.82)
−0.0032c
(−1.72)
−0.0031c
(−1.69)
−0.0029
(−1.58)
−0.0028
(−1.55)
−0.0033c
(−1.81)
SIZEit −0.9589c
(−1.82)
−0.9928c
(−1.90)
−1.0517c
(−1.66)
−1.1704c
(−1.75)
−1.2817c
(−1.83)
−0.9492c
(−1.69)
NIMit−2 0.0030a
(2.65)
0.0029a
(2.61)
0.0029b
(2.46)
0.0022b
(1.99)
0.0021c
(1.83)
0.0030a
(2.65)
NIMit−3 −0.0021
(−0.64)
−0.0026
(−0.81)
−0.0029
(−0.91)
−0.0026
(−0.78)
−0.0031
(−0.91)
−0.0021
(−0.65)
EQUITYit−2 −0.9778
(−0.91)
−0.8817
(−0.81)
−0.8447
(−0.76)
−1.2976
(−1.27)
−1.2435
(−1.20)
−0.9859
(−0.91)
EQUITYit−3 1.4028
(1.39)
1.3657
(1.35)
1.3122
(1.28)
1.3151
(1.33)
1.2458
(1.24)
1.4099
(1.39)
PREMit−3 0.0123
(0.65)
0.0147
(0.79)
0.0159
(0.85)
0.0140
(0.73)
0.0158
(0.82)
0.0126
(0.67)
RMSHAREit −0.7202a
(−3.01)
−0.6198a
(−2.89)
−0.6134a
(−2.78)
−0.7029a
(−3.25)
RPPRICEt−1 −0.0102b
(−1.97)
−0.0144a
(−2.74)
RMSHAREit∗RPPRICEt−1 −0.0177a
(−2.67)
−0.0019c
(−1.85)
−0.0272a
(−3.83)
−0.0022c
(−1.83)
−0.0035c
(−1.77)
LTVt 0.1883
a
(4.37)
0.1938a
(4.44)
Time Period 1999-2006 1999-2006 1999-2006 1999-2006 1999-2006 1999-2006
# Observations 3297 3297 3297 3297 3297 3297
Sargan Test (p-value) 0.199 0.201 0.227 0.275 0.233 0.253
AR (1) and p-value −3.0a (0.00) −2.7a (0.00) −2.5a (0.00) −2.9a (0.00) −2.0b (0.04)
AR (2) and p-value 0.4 (0.77) 0.5 (0.60) −1.1 (0.29) −1.2 (0.25) −1.1 (0.27) −0.9 (0.18)
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table reports the estimation results of six regressions based on equation (4) for the total sample without
investment banks and a period until 2006 (pre-crisis time). The dependent variable PROV is the ratio of loan losses
provisions and the total net loans (PROV) and is used as a proxy of the bank’s credit risk (RISK). This variable
appears transformed (dependent variable ln(RISKit/(1 − RISKit)). GDP is the real GDP growth; DFAM is the
ratio between the liabilities of families and the GDP; DEMP is the ratio between the liabilities of firms and GDP;
LOAN TO ASSETS is the ratio of total loans to total assets; INEF is the ratio of operating costs to gross income;
SIZE is the ratio between bank assets i and the total bank assets; NIM is the proxy for bank profitability measured
by net interest margin (gross margin); EQUITY is the ratio between the capital and total assets; PREM is obtained
from the difference between interest income over total assets and the interbank interest rate; RMSHARE is the weight
of residential mortgage loans in the total bank assets; RPPRICE is the rate of growth in real terms of the residential
housing market prices (or region, in the case of regression XVI, for banks with regional or international exposure to
the housing market). LTV is the average loan to value ratio in the country where the bank operates. We use the
Dynamic Panel Analysis (Arellano and Bond, 1991) and GMM estimation procedure. t statistics are presented in
brackets. a, b and c denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Most of the control variables coefficients show the expected sign, al-
though some are not statistically significant. The GDP growth rate (cur-
rent and lagged one-year) has a negative effect on credit risk, as predicted
by theory. For the other two macroeconomic variables, families and compa-
nies’ indebtedness, the coefficient is, respectively positive and significant,
as expected, and negative or not statistically significant in majority speci-
fications. The weight of credit in bank assets and banks’ relative size also
affects the level of loan provision or non-performing loans, as expected.
The results illustrate that larger banks seem to account for a lower relative
weight of loan provisions or non-performing loans in their balance sheets.
The variables associated with the inefficiency level and solvency ratio are
not statistically significant at conventional levels for the majority of esti-
mations. This may be the result of multicolinearity issues. With regard
to the solvency ratio, Davis and Zhu (2009) argue that its effect on credit
risk is unclear. The authors state that when the solvency ratio is high,
the incentives for taking risks are lower. Therefore, a negative sign is to
be expected. However, capital ratios that are too-low may lead to banks
to “gamble for resurrection”. This may therefore, have the opposite im-
pact on banks’ lending decisions. Banks’ interest margins are statistically
significant. As for the proxy for the risk premium, it is not statistically
significant in the specifications for all the banks (panels A, C and F), but
statistically significant in 2 and 3 of the 4 specifications, in panel B and
E, respectively, for the subsamples. Salas and Saurina (2002) argue that
the lack of a positive impact may occur if strong competition introduces
cross-subsidization of products inside banks.
The aim of the specifications IV, V, XIV and XV shown in table 8 (panels
A and D and C and F) is to analyse the impact of institutional factors
on bank credit risk. We use the “Loan-to-Value” (LTV) ratio, obtained
from the ECB, which corresponds to the average loan-to-value ratio in
the country where the bank operates. The LTV ratios are used due to
the absence of information set out individually by banks regarding these
ratios. Specifications IV, V, XIV and XV show that countries with higher
LTV ratios observe higher level of loan losses provisions. In panels C and F
(table 8) we estimate the regressions performed in panel A and D for total
sample without investment banks and for a period until 2006 (pre-crisis
time). The results obtained are in line with those obtained in panel A and
D.
We repeat the regressions based on subsamples of banks (panel B and E).
Specifications VII and VIII refer, respectively, to the clusters of Germany
and Austria, and Spain, Ireland and the United Kingdom. Results suggest
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that the impact of increasing residential mortgage loans on total assets leads
to a credit risk reduction in the cluster formed by Germany and Austria.
Moreover, the specification VIII shows that in the cluster of Spain, Ireland
and United Kingdom, the impact of increasing residential mortgage loans
on total assets leads to an increase in credit risk. Specifications IX and X
analyze the effects of increasing residential mortgage loans on bank credit
risk in the 1st and 4th quartiles of banks, divided on the basis of the weight
of residential mortgage loans on total credit. The results reveal that an
increase in residential mortgage loans results in a decrease in credit risk, in
the case of 1st quartile (with less residential mortgage loans) and a positive
but insignificant effect, in the case of 4th quartile.
In order to assess the robustness of the results we re-estimated the mod-
els under a variety of alternative specifications. Firstly, to avoid some of
the multicolinearity issues, we remove from the model all of the lagged
variables where the coefficient was not statistically significant. Our con-
clusions remain unchanged. Second, all the results (signs and significance
of parameters) hold if the risk premium does not appear in regressions or
if another proxy is used. Finally, we find that the basic results do not
change when we apply static panel data procedures or when we estimate
the model without time fixed effects. All of these results are available upon
request from the authors. Finally, the hypotheses of the absence of a time
series second order correlation (the regressions were estimated in the first
difference) and of the validity of the instruments used (Sargan test) are not
rejected.
4.2. Profitability Model
Table 9 (panel A to D) presents the results of the linear regressions
between bank profitability and the weight of residential mortgage loans
in total assets, as specified in equation (5). The results of the five spec-
ifications of panel B and D (total sample without investment banks for
pre-crisis period) reveal that those banks increasing their weight of res-
idential mortgage loans in total assets saw their profitability rise during
the period analyzed (2002 to 2006). The coefficient associated with the
variable RMSHARE is positive and statistically significant. In contrast,
the results obtained for the five regressions in panel A and C do not show
the existence of a statistically significant relationship between the weight
of residential mortgage loans in total assets and banks’ profitability. By
looking at specification II and III (panel A and C), we conclude that bank
profitability tends to decrease during an upturn in the residential property
cycle. This can be at least partly explained by the “disaster myopia” phe-
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nomenon. As discussed above, in periods of house prices rises, banks tend
to expand credit to riskier customers and collateral requirements tend to
decrease. These conclusions are also corroborated by specifications IV and
V, where the residential property prices variable is replaced by the cumu-
lative real growth of residential property prices in the country (or region,
in the case of specification V) where a bank operates.
The conclusion that bank profitability decreases during an upturn in the
residential property cycle is also corroborated by specifications VII to X
(panel B and D), estimated for total sample without investment banks and
pre-crisis period. Identical results were obtained by Davis and Zhu (2009).
The results obtained by them suggest a negative relationship between com-
mercial property prices and bank’s interest margin.
Table 9 (panel E) tests the hypothesis of a non-linear relationship be-
tween profitability and the weight of residential mortgage loans as specified
in equation (6). Specifications XIII and XIV (total sample without invest-
ment banks for the pre-crisis period) reject the hypothesis of a non-linear
relationship, as a function of bank risk, between profitability and residen-
tial mortgage exposure. Conversely, the specifications XI and XII sup-
port the hypothesis that there is a U-shaped non-linear relationship. The
coefficients of the interaction variables, RMSHAREit × RISKit−1 and
RMSHAREit× (RISKit−1)2, are negative and positive, respectively, and
statistically significant at conventional levels. The results of the F-statistic
to test for the significance of the linear and quadratic terms, separately
and together, reveal that the coefficients of these variables are statistically
significant, contributing towards increasing the explanatory power of the
regression. If we analyze the roots of specifications XI and XII, we find
risk variable to have the value of 0.0206 and 0.0944 (specification XI) and
0.0231 and 0.0846 (specification XII). Until 2.06% and 2.31%, for specifi-
cation XI and XII, respectively, the effect of weight of residential mortgage
loans on bank’s profitability is positive — in our database, approximately
94.96% and 97.36%, for specification XI and XII, respectively, of the obser-
vations are of banks with a risk variable lower than these values. Between
2.06% and 9.44% (specification XI) and 2.31% and 8.46% (specification
XII), the effect becomes negative — approximately 4.63% (specification
XI) and 2.09% (specification XII) of the observations are of banks with
a risk variable between these values. Finally, above 9.44% (specification
XI) and 8.46% (specification XII), the effect is again positive, but only
0.41% (specification XI) and 0.55% (specification XII) have a risk variable
higher. Given that the vast majority of values for the risk variable in our
database are lower than the first root in specifications XI and XII, we may
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TABLE 9.
Profitability Determinants: Dynamic Panel Analysis
Panel A: Linear Regressions and Bank’s Profitability Proxy: Net Interest Margin (NIM)
Variables I II III IV V
NIMit−1 5.921a
(42.69)
5.935a
(40.05)
5.924a
(42.69)
5.918a
(41.53)
5.918a
(41.45)
GDPt 0.080
c
(1.75)
0.066a
(2.71)
0.079c
(1.73)
0.084c
(1.84)
0.085c
(1.84)
GDPt−1 −0.014
(−0.28)
−0.017
(−0.26)
−0.015
(−0.28)
−0.008
(−0.15)
−0.007
(−0.14)
BBMBt 0.105
c
(1.97)
0.122c
(1.81)
0.107c
(1.98)
0.150c
(1.83)
0.147c
(1.90)
RISKit−2 0.495a
(15.93)
0.499a
(16.67)
0.494a
(16.11)
0.491a
(15.66)
0.491a
(15.65)
RISKit−3 0.832a
(19.52)
0.839a
(20.88)
0.833a
(19.68)
0.829a
(19.08)
0.829a
(19.06)
LIQit−1 0.013a
(3.20)
0.014b
(2.55)
0.013a
(3.00)
0.013a
(3.18)
0.013a
(3.17)
LIQit−2 0.011a
(2.61)
0.011a
(2.65)
0.012a
(2.71)
0.012a
(2.98)
0.012a
(2.97)
SDR3Mit−1 0.185c
(1.72)
0.190b
(2.01)
0.108c
(1.73)
0.103c
(1.69)
0.103c
(1.70)
SDR3Mit−2 0.181c
(1.92)
0.156c
(1.65)
0.212b
(2.20)
0.209b
(2.19)
0.208b
(2.19)
HHt −0.001
(−1.14)
−0.001
(−1.32)
−0.001
(−1.28)
−0.001
(−1.22)
−0.001
(−1.21)
INEFit −0.005b
(−2.12)
−0.005b
(−2.22)
−0.005b
(−2.10)
−0.005b
(−2.07)
−0.005b
(−2.07)
∆LOANit −0.011a
(−5.11)
−0.010a
(−5.48)
−0.011a
(−5.23)
−0.011a
(−5.00)
−0.011a
(−4.99)
EQUITYit−2 7.138b
(2.15)
7.810b
(2.27)
7.164b
(2.16)
7.019b
(−2.12)
6.993b
(2.12)
EQUITYit−3 1.922
(0.63)
1.772
(0.56)
1.938
(0.64)
1.780
(0.58)
1.796
(0.59)
IPPit 2.544
c
(1.77)
2.062c
(1.84)
2.473
(1.05)
2.648
(1.09)
2.650
(1.09)
RMSHAREit 0.696
(0.66)
0.842
(0.78)
1.005
(0.93)
0.961
(0.89)
0.976
(0.91)
RMSHAREit∗RPPRICEt−1 −0.023b
(−2.32)
−0.029b
(−2.42)
−0.017b
(−2.27)
−0.016b
(−2.22)
Time Period 2002-2008 2002-2008 2002-2008 2002-2008 2002-2008
# Observations 3555 3555 3555 3555 3555
Sargan Test (p-value) 0.179 0.169 0.130 0.126 0.158
AR (1) and p-value −4.7a (0.00) −3.9a (0.00) −3.3a (0.00) −3.4a (0.00) −3.9a (0.00)
AR (2) and p-value −0.5 (0.29) −0.3 (0.73) −0.5 (0.22) 0.2 (0.66) −0.2 (0.60)
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table reports the estimation results of 5 regressions on the profitability of banks based on equation (5). We
use the Dynamic Panel Analysis (Arellano and Bond, 1991) and GMM procedure. The dependent variable NIM is
measured by net interest margin (gross margin) and is used as the proxy for bank profitability (PROFIT). GDP is the
real GDP growth; BBMB is a dummy that takes the value 1 for banks that operate in financial systems based on the
banking sector and the value 0 for systems based on the capital market. The dummy variable takes the value 0 to the
Netherlands, UK, Finland, Denmark and Ireland and the value 1 for the remaining countries of the EU-15; RISK is
the proxy of the bank’s credit risk and is measured by the ratio of provisions for loan losses and the total net loans;
LIQ is the ratio of net loans to short term funding; SDR3M is the annual standard deviation of the daily interbank
at 3 month interest rate; HH is the Herfindahl and Hirschman Index obtained via total assets on the domestic market
(the ratio was obtained from the ECB and range between 0 and 10.000); INEF is the ratio of operating costs to gross
income; ∆LOAN is the loans growth rate; EQUITY is the ratio between the capital and total assets; IPP is the ratio
non-interest expenses — non-interest revenues)/total assets; RMSHARE is the weight of residential mortgage loans in
the total bank assets; RPPRICE is the rate of growth in real terms of the domestic residential housing market prices
(or region, in the case of regression III, for banks with regional or international exposure to the housing market). In
the case of regressions IV and V, RPPRICE is the accumulated growth rate of real market prices of residential housing
in the country (or region, in the case of regression V, for banks with regional or international exposure to the housing
market). t statistics are presented in brackets. a, b and c denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY LOANS AND BANK PERFORMANCE 289
TABLE 9—Continued
Panel B: Linear Regressions: Total Sample without Investment Banks for
Pre-Crisis Period Bank’s Profitability Proxy: Net Interest Margin (NIM)
Variables VI VII VIII XIX X
NIMit−1 0.409a
(58.88)
0.408a
(53.95)
0.408a
(59.05)
0.408a
(58.36)
0.408a
(58.51)
GDPt 0.019
c
(1.67)
0.025c
(1.89)
0.020c
(1.67)
0.019
(1.55)
0.019
(1.55)
GDPt−1 0.008
(0.84)
0.011
(1.11)
0.009
(0.90)
0.007
(0.75)
0.007
(0.75)
BBMBt 0.210
c
(1.82)
0.189c
(1.73)
0.198c
(1.95)
0.211c
(1.96)
0.207c
(1.95)
RISKit−2 0.324a
(25.61)
0.325a
(24.89)
0.324a
(25.47)
0.323a
(26.18)
0.323a
(26.21)
RISKit−3 0.304a
(23.74)
0.305a
(23.55)
0.305a
(23.71)
0.303a
(24.02)
0.303a
(24.01)
LIQit−1 0.024b
(2.16)
0.021b
(1.97)
0.025b
(2.28)
0.011b
(2.49)
0.011b
(2.50)
LIQit−2 0.015a
(2.97)
0.015a
(2.75)
0.018
(1.17)
0.048b
(2.42)
0.048b
(2.41)
SDR3Mit−1 0.106c
(1.81)
0.115
(1.45)
0.107c
(1.85)
0.245b
(2.11)
0.243b
(2.10)
SDR3Mit−2 0.049b
(2.46)
0.506b
(2.49)
0.051b
(2.57)
0.154
(1.03)
0.155
(1.04)
HHt −0.001
(−0.66)
−0.001
(−0.88)
−0.001
(−0.73)
−0.001
(−0.69)
−0.001
(−0.69)
INEFit −0.014a
(−2.92)
−0.014a
(−2.68)
−0.014a
(−2.93)
−0.014a
(−2.92)
−0.014a
(−2.92)
∆LOANit −0.002a
(−7.84)
−0.002a
(−7.87)
−0.002a
(−7.92)
−0.021a
(−7.64)
−0.021a
(−7.66)
EQUITYit−2 7.226b
(2.01)
7.135b
(2.09)
7.257b
(2.26)
7.441c
(1.83)
7.426c
(1.82)
EQUITYit−3 0.741
(1.19)
0.741
(1.20)
0.724
(1.17)
0.733
(1.17)
0.728
(1.15)
IPPit 3.379
a
(4.72)
3.366a
(4.25)
3.375a
(4.74)
3.382a
(4.64)
3.383a
(4.64)
RMSHAREit 0.951
b
(2.19)
1.056b
(2.13)
0.937b
(2.04)
0.914b
(1.99)
0.915b
(1.99)
RMSHAREit∗RPPRICEt−1 −0.071a
(−2.63)
−0.037b
(−2.12)
−0.042b
(2.10)
−0.031b
(−2.07)
Time Period 2002-2006 2002-2006 2002-2006 2002-2006 2002-2006
# Observations 2338 2338 2338 2338 2338
Sargan Test (p-value) 0.177 0.145 0.132 0.158 0.149
AR (1) and p-value −4.5a (0.00) −3.8a (0.00) −3.2a (0.00) −4.0a (0.00) −3.6a (0.00)
AR (2) and p-value −0.5 (0.38) −0.2 (0.82) −0.5 (0.20) 0.3 (0.55) 0.1 (0.78)
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table reports the estimation results of 5 regressions on the profitability of banks based on equation (5) for the
total sample without investment banks and a period until 2006 (pre-crisis time). We use the Dynamic Panel Analysis
(Arellano and Bond, 1991) and GMM procedure. The dependent variable NIM is measured by net interest margin
(gross margin) (NIM) and is used as the proxy for bank profitability (PROFIT). GDP is the real GDP growth; BBMB
is a dummy that takes the value 1 for banks that operate in financial systems based on the banking sector and the value
0 for systems based on the capital market. The dummy variable takes the value 0 to the Netherlands, UK, Finland,
Denmark and Ireland and the value 1 for the remaining countries of the EU-15; RISK is the proxy of the bank’s credit
risk and is measured by the ratio of provisions for loan losses and the total net loans; LIQ is the ratio of net loans to
short term funding; SDR3M is the annual standard deviation of the daily interbank at 3 month interest rate; HH is the
Herfindahl and Hirschman Index obtained via total assets on the domestic market (the ratio was obtained from the ECB
and range between 0 and 10.000); INEF is the ratio of operating costs to gross income; ∆LOAN is the loans growth
rate; EQUITY is the ratio between the capital and total assets; IPP is the ratio non-interest expenses — non-interest
revenues)/total assets; RMSHARE is the weight of residential mortgage loans in the total bank assets; RPPRICE is
the rate of growth in real terms of the domestic residential housing market prices (or region, in the case of regression
VIII, for banks with regional or international exposure to the housing market). In the case of regressions IX and X,
RPPRICE is the accumulated growth rate of real market prices of residential housing in the country (or region, in the
case of regression X, for banks with regional or international exposure to the housing market). t statistics are presented
in brackets. a, b and c denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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TABLE 9—Continued
Panel C: Linear Regressions and Bank’s Profitability Proxy: Return on Assets (ROA)
Variables I II III IV V
ROAit−1 0.678b
(2.07)
0.678b
(2.07)
0.678b
(2.06)
0.676b
(2.06)
0.676b
(2.06)
GDPt 0.045
c
(1.66)
0.047c
(1.67)
0.045c
(1.66)
0.043c
(1.70)
0.042c
(1.70)
GDPt−1 0.011
(0.26)
0.014
(0.34)
0.011
(0.27)
0.007
(0.18)
0.007
(0.17)
BBMBt 0.072
b
(2.50)
0.076b
(2.56)
0.071b
(2.45)
0.066b
(2.13)
0.065b
(2.13)
RISKit−2 1.888a
(2.83)
1.886a
(2.83)
1.886a
(2.82)
1.884a
(2.82)
1.884a
(2.82)
RISKit−3 1.137
(1.47)
1.136
(1.47)
1.137
(1.46)
1.135
(1.46)
1.134
(1.46)
LIQit−1 0.032a
(2.99)
0.035a
(2.90)
0.030a
(2.89)
0.033a
(2.75)
0.033a
(2.75)
LIQit−2 0.054b
(2.13)
0.070b
(2.20)
0.056b
(2.20)
0.052b
(2.09)
0.052b
(2.08)
SDR3Mit−1 0.061c
(1.67)
0.056
(1.52)
0.064c
(1.68)
0.062c
(1.68)
0.062c
(1.69)
SDR3Mit−2 0.194a
(3.51)
0.181a
(3.11)
0.198a
(3.56)
0.195a
(3.53)
0.195a
(3.53)
HHt −0.002
(−0.57)
−0.002
(−0.46)
−0.002
(−0.61)
−0.002
(−0.46)
−0.002
(−0.46)
INEFit −0.016a
(−2.79)
−0.016a
(−2.79)
−0.016a
(−2.79)
−0.016a
(−2.79)
−0.016a
(−2.79)
∆LOANit −0.006
(−1.06)
−0.006
(−1.06)
−0.006
(−1.07)
−0.006
(−1.10)
−0.006
(−1.10)
EQUITYit−2 4.012c
(1.82)
3.988c
(1.71)
4.007c
(1.73)
4.031c
(1.69)
4.035c
(1.69)
EQUITYit−3 −0.695
(−0.26)
−0.693
(−0.26)
−0.708
(−0.27)
−0.649
(−0.25)
−0.645
(−0.25)
IPPit 1.093
a
(9.06)
1.094a
(9.04)
1.093a
(9.06)
1.093a
(9.08)
1.092a
(9.09)
RMSHAREit −1.548
(−1.56)
−1.495
(−1.51)
−1.502
(−1.51)
−1.619
(−1.59)
−1.630
(−1.60)
RMSHAREit∗RPPRICEt−1 −0.009c
(−1.89)
−0.006c
(−1.87)
−0.005c
(−1.77)
−0.005c
(−1.86)
Time Period 2002-2008 2002-2008 2002-2008 2002-2008 2002-2008
# Observations 3555 3555 3555 3555 3555
Sargan Test (p-value) 0.155 0.190 0.142 0.133 0.166
AR (1) and p-value −4.1a (0.00) −3.5a (0.00) −3.2a (0.00) −3.6a (0.00) −3.7a (0.00)
AR (2) and p-value −0.5 (0.22) −0.3 (0.70) −0.5 (0.20) 0.3 (0.74) −0.3 (0.72)
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table reports the estimation results of 5 regressions on the profitability of banks based on equation (5). We use
the Dynamic Panel Analysis (Arellano and Bond, 1991) and GMM procedure. The dependent variable ROA is the
return on assets and is used as the proxy for bank profitability (PROFIT). GDP is the real GDP growth; BBMB is a
dummy that takes the value 1 for banks that operate in financial systems based on the banking sector and the value
0 for systems based on the capital market. The dummy variable takes the value 0 to the Netherlands, UK, Finland,
Denmark and Ireland and the value 1 for the remaining countries of the EU-15; RISK is the proxy of the bank’s credit
risk and is measured by the ratio of provisions for loan losses and the total net loans; LIQ is the ratio of net loans to
short term funding; SDR3M is the annual standard deviation of the daily interbank at 3 month interest rate; HH is
the Herfindahl and Hirschman Index obtained via total assets on the domestic market (the ratio was obtained from
the ECB and range between 0 and 10.000); INEF is the ratio of operating costs to gross income; ∆LOAN is the
loans growth rate; EQUITY is the ratio between the capital and total assets; IPP is the ratio non-interest expenses
— non-interest revenues)/total assets; RMSHARE is the weight of residential mortgage loans in the total bank assets;
RPPRICE is the rate of growth in real terms of the domestic residential housing market prices (or region, in the case
of regression III, for banks with regional or international exposure to the housing market). In the case of regressions IV
and V, RPPRICE is the accumulated growth rate of real market prices of residential housing in the country (or region,
in the case of regression V, for banks with regional or international exposure to the housing market). t statistics are
presented in brackets. a, b and c denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY LOANS AND BANK PERFORMANCE 291
TABLE 9—Continued
Panel D: Linear Regressions: Total Sample without Investment Banks for
Pre-Crisis Period and Bank’s Profitability Proxy: Return on Assets (ROA)
Variables VI VII VIII XIX X
ROAit−1 0.350a
(5.15)
0.349a
(5.14)
0.350a
(5.14)
0.350a
(5.16)
0.351a
(5.16)
GDPt 0.032
c
(1.87)
0.036c
(1.90)
0.042b
(1.99)
0.027c
(1.87)
0.026c
(1.85)
GDPt−1 0.020
(1.00)
0.022
(1.07)
0.022
(1.04)
0.020
(0.93)
0.019
(0.92)
BBMBt 0.347
c
(1.75)
0.366c
(1.81)
0.384c
(1.88)
0.306c
(1.72)
0.307c
(1.75)
RISKit−2 0.758a
(4.04)
0.755a
(4.02)
0.759a
(4.03)
0.761a
(4.07)
0.761a
(4.07)
RISKit−3 0.036
(0.18)
0.033
(0.17)
0.036
(0.18)
0.037
(0.19)
0.038
(0.19)
LIQit−1 0.033b
(2.23)
0.031b
(2.11)
0.036b
(2.35)
0.035b
(2.25)
0.035b
(2.25)
LIQit−2 0.028a
(2.64)
0.028a
(2.65)
0.033a
(2.87)
0.028a
(2.66)
0.028a
(2.66)
SDR3Mit−1 0.054b
(2.21)
0.054b
(2.20)
0.051b
(2.09)
0.053b
(2.16)
0.053b
(2.16)
SDR3Mit−2 0.116a
(3.29)
0.116a
(3.29)
0.121a
(3.34)
0.117a
(3.32)
0.117a
(3.32)
HHt −0.002
(−0.87)
−0.002
(−0.94)
−0.002
(−0.94)
−0.002
(−0.90)
−0.002
(−0.90)
INEFit −0.011a
(−2.62)
−0.011a
(−2.61)
−0.011a
(−2.60)
−0.011a
(−2.60)
−0.011a
(−2.60)
∆LOANit −0.001c
(−1.82)
−0.001c
(−1.82)
−0.001c
(−1.83)
−0.001c
(−1.83)
−0.001c
(−1.84)
EQUITYit−2 5.961b
(2.13)
5.963b
(2.12)
5.975b
(2.13)
5.922b
(2.12)
5.926b
(2.12)
EQUITYit−3 1.985b
(2.23)
1.974b
(2.21)
1.965b
(2.20)
1.977b
(2.24)
1.976b
(2.24)
IPPit 3.622
a
(6.59)
3.627a
(6.60)
3.622a
(6.57)
3.614a
(6.65)
3.614a
(6.65)
RMSHAREit 0.252
b
(2.06)
0.069b
(2.33)
0.029b
(2.00)
0.065b
(2.15)
0.079b
(2.22)
RMSHAREit∗RPPRICEt−1 −0.039b
(−2.20)
−0.066c
(−1.92)
−0.019c
(−1.77)
−0.017c
(−1.71)
Time Period 2002-2006 2002-2006 2002-2006 2002-2006 2002-2006
# Observations 2338 2338 2338 2338 2338
Sargan Test (p-value) 0.150 0.166 0.152 0.177 0.159
AR (1) and p-value −4.2a (0.00) −4.1a (0.00) −3.5a (0.00) −3.9a (0.00) −3.7a (0.00)
AR (2) and p-value −0.2 (0.80) 0.3 (0.55) −0.4 (0.75) 0.1 (0.80) 0.2 (0.66)
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table reports the estimation results of 5 regressions on the profitability of banks based on equation (5) for the
total sample without investment banks and a period until 2006 (pre-crisis time). We use the Dynamic Panel Analysis
(Arellano and Bond, 1991) and GMM procedure. The dependent variable ROA is the return on assets and is used as
the proxy for bank profitability (PROFIT). GDP is the real GDP growth; BBMB is a dummy that takes the value
1 for banks that operate in financial systems based on the banking sector and the value 0 for systems based on the
capital market. The dummy variable takes the value 0 to the Netherlands, UK, Finland, Denmark and Ireland and the
value 1 for the remaining countries of the EU-15; RISK is the proxy of the bank’s credit risk and is measured by the
ratio of provisions for loan losses and the total net loans; LIQ is the ratio of net loans to short term funding; SDR3M
is the annual standard deviation of the daily interbank at 3 month interest rate; HH is the Herfindahl and Hirschman
Index obtained via total assets on the domestic market (the ratio was obtained from the ECB and range between 0
and 10.000); INEF is the ratio of operating costs to gross income; ∆LOAN is the loans growth rate; EQUITY is the
ratio between the capital and total assets; IPP is the ratio non-interest expenses — non-interest revenues)/total assets;
RMSHARE is the weight of residential mortgage loans in the total bank assets; RPPRICE is the rate of growth in real
terms of the domestic residential housing market prices (or region, in the case of regression VIII, for banks with regional
or international exposure to the housing market). In the case of regressions IX and X, RPPRICE is the accumulated
growth rate of real market prices of residential housing in the country (or region, in the case of regression X, for banks
with regional or international exposure to the housing market). t statistics are presented in brackets. a, b and c denote
statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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TABLE 9—Continued
Panel E: Quadratic Regressions
Variables XI XII XIII XIV
NIMit−1 5.525a
(19.44)
5.514a
(22.32)
0.514a
(6.90)
0.817a
(9.60)
GDPt 0.069
c
(1.68)
0.078c
(1.85)
0.021b
(2.37)
0.069c
(1.87)
GDPt−1 −0.062
(−1.20)
0.026
(0.53)
−0.005
(−1.07)
0.007
(1.06)
BBMBt 0.157
b
(2.52)
0.156b
(2.52)
0.066a
(9.13)
0.133a
(4.42)
RISKit−2 4.214c
(1.70)
10.168c
(1.99)
2.308
(1.48)
6.944c
(1.78)
RISKit−3 −7.164
(−1.22)
−5.189
(−0.98)
1.329a
(2.59)
−1.057
(−1.10)
LIQit−1 0.183a
(3.41)
0.161a
(3.30)
0.036a
(2.92)
0.025a
(2.72)
LIQit−2 0.071
(1.45)
0.056
(1.01)
0.000
(0.37)
0.000
(0.74)
SDR3Mit−1 0.125c
(1.86)
0.118c
(1.79)
0.012c
(1.69)
0.022c
(1.84)
SDR3Mit−2 0.192b
(2.10)
0.204b
(2.22)
0.071a
(4.24)
0.085b
(2.18)
HHt −0.096c
(1.79)
−0.125b
(−2.43)
−0.042a
(−3.12)
0.000
(1.08)
INEFit −0.007a
(−2.85)
−0.008a
(−3.12)
−0.017a
(−8.84)
−0.004b
(−2.27)
∆LOANit −0.030b
(−2.15)
−0.035a
(−2.91)
−0.038b
(−2.12)
−0.008a
(−5.83)
EQUITYit−2 6.222b
(2.12)
7.619b
(2.50)
−1.148
(−1.43)
7.619b
(2.50)
EQUITYit−3 0.959
(0.24)
1.607
(0.43)
2.528a
(2.60)
3.408b
(1.99)
IPPit 9.667
b
(2.01)
10.790b
(2.57)
4.144a
(5.25)
8.854b
(2.04)
RMSHAREit 3.084
c
(1.85)
3.879b
(2.26)
1.669a
(2.85)
−0.088
(−0.96)
RMSHAREit∗RISKit−1 −182.122a
(−2.74)
−213.578a
(−2.93)
−0.150
(−0.02)
−14.837
(−0.73)
RMSHAREit ∗ (RISKit−1)2 1582.752c
(1.89)
1982.967b
(2.56)
111.77
(1.01)
174.467b
(2.26)
LTVt 0.531
a
(5.60)
0.199a
(2.71)
Time Period 2002-2008 2002-2008 2002-2006 2002-2006
# Observations 3554 3554 2335 2335
Sargan Test (p-value) 0.166 0.171 0.175 0.157
AR (1) and p-value −4.2a (0.00) −3.9a (0.00) −4.8a (0.00) −3.6a (0.00)
AR (2) and p-value 0.4 (0.48) −0.4 (0.51) 0.2 (0.88) −0.6 (0.26)
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table reports the estimation results of 4 regressions on the profitability of banks based on
equation (6). We use the Dynamic Panel Analysis (Arellano and Bond, 1991) and GMM procedure.
The dependent variable NIM is measured by net interest margin (gross margin) and is used as the
proxy for bank profitability (PROFIT). GDP is the real GDP growth; BBMB is a dummy that takes
the value 1 for banks that operate in financial systems based on the banking sector and the value 0
for systems based on the capital market. The dummy variable takes the value 0 to the Netherlands,
UK, Finland, Denmark and Ireland and the value 1 for the remaining countries of the EU-15; RISK
is the proxy of the bank’s credit risk and is measured by the ratio of provisions for loan losses and the
total net loans; LIQ is the ratio of net loans to short term funding; SDR3M is the annual standard
deviation of the daily interbank at 3 month interest rate; HH is the Herfindahl and Hirschman Index
obtained via total assets on the domestic market (the ratio was obtained from the ECB and range
between 0 and 10.000); INEF is the ratio of operating costs to gross income; ∆LOAN is the loans
growth rate; EQUITY is the ratio between the capital and total assets; IPP is the ratio non-interest
expenses — non-interest revenues)/total assets; RMSHARE is the weight of residential mortgage
loans in the total bank assets; LTV is the average loan to value ratio, by country. Regressions XI
and XII include all the banks for the period 2002 to 2008. Regressions XIII and XIV are estimated
for the total sample without investment banks and a period until 2006 (pre-crisis time). t statistics
are presented in brackets. a, b and c denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY LOANS AND BANK PERFORMANCE 293
conclude that this U-shaped relation is almost equal to a linear relation
with downward trend.
With regard to the control variables, the lagged PROFIT variable reveals
a statistically significant positive sign. In the majority of the specifications,
credit risk, liquidity risk, interest rate risk and the concentration index are
also statistically significant with a positive effect on banks’ profitability.
This is consistent with previous findings (e.g. Angbazo, 1997). The re-
sults also illustrate that inefficient banks tend to have lower profitability
margins, in line with studies such as Maudos and Guevara (2004). The
positive statistically significant sign associated with the solvency ratio, in
the majority of specifications, could suggest that banks require a premium
in their margins, due to the pressures of ensuring solvency by regulators.
The negative and statistically significant coefficient of the ∆LOAN variable
(loan growth rate) suggests that banks that register high loan growth may
be required to work with lower banking margins, as suggested by Petersen
and Rajan (1995) and supported by the findings of Valverde and Fernande´z
(2007). The IPP variable (implicit interest payments) has a positive coef-
ficient and is statistically significant, for the majority of regressions. This
variable reflects extra payments to depositors through service charge re-
mission or other types of transfers due to competition in the market for
deposits. These extra payments tend to cause an increase in the banks gross
margins consistent with the results of Angbazo (1997). The GDP growth
rate also shows a positive and statistically significant effect on banks’ gross
margins. Finally, the dummy associated with the structure of financial
systems, reveals that a bank-based system tends to produce larger gross
margins than countries that operate a market-based financial system.
The coefficient associated with the country’s average LTV ratio, which is
acting as a proxy for the institutional characteristics of the mortgage mar-
ket, is positive and statistical significant. This would suggest that banks in
countries where credit-granting practices are less conservative (high lever-
age ratios) tend to require a higher profitability margins. Finally, the non-
rejection of the null hypotheses of the Sargan test and the second-order
autocorrelation test allow us to conclude drawn from the estimated mod-
els appear supported. We find that the basic results do not change when
we apply static panel data procedures or when we estimate the regression
without time fixed effects26.
26These results are available from the authors upon request.
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5. CONCLUSION
This paper has evaluated the effects of residential mortgage loan lending
on the risk and profitability of a sample over 500 EU-15 banks. The sample,
running from 1995 through 2008 captures much of the recent cycle, and
especially the increase in residential lending observed in many markets
prior to the 2007-8 financial crisis. The results illustrate the importance
of residential property lending and the significant impact it may have on
bank performance. Broadly, the results indicate that increasing residential
mortgage lending during strong property market conditions, in our case
pre-2007, leads to an improvement in the performance of banks. This is
found to be the case both with respect to profitability and credit risk.
These findings can in part be explained by the fact that the asset is used
as collateral to obtain other loans and is perceived by banks as contributing
towards reducing credit risk.
When we take into account the behaviour and dynamics of the residen-
tial property market we find that impact of increasing property prices on
banks’ lending behavior is consistent with the theoretical predictions of
the financial accelerator. Increasing residential property prices encourage
banks to lend more, and risk premiums shrink when property prices rise.
The results show that the decrease in credit risk as result of an increase
in the weight of residential mortgage loans is higher during an upturn in
the property cycle and in countries with more conservative lending prac-
tices. However, the results also illustrate that bank profitability tends to
decrease during an upturn in the residential market. The results do also
appear to indicate that house price appreciation leads to a fall in provisions
and in non-performing loans. Whilst this in part may be due to the fact
that mortgage loans rarely default during periods of price appreciation,
there are other considerations. It may also be the result of banks delay
provisions, with the result that risk emerges at a later date.
The results highlight the need to develop indicators of bank’s individual
exposure to the real estate market in order to calibrate the potential impact
of changes in weights and prices of residential housing assets on bank risk
and profitability. Given that our sample period only covers a small part
of the crisis period, we suggest further analysis and research about the
relationship between residential property loans and bank performance for
the crisis period. As Koetter and Poghosyan (2010) have shown, deviations
from fundamental value of real estate tend to contribute to bank instability.
These results given the policy of delaying the recognition of loan losses
provisions may be more fully captured by a wider temporal sample.
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